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ANTISUIT INJUNCTIONS AND PRECLUSION AGAINST
ABSENT NONRESIDENT CLASS MEMBERS
Henry Paul Monaghan*
In this Article, Professor Monaghan addresses an issue of pressing con-
cern in class action litigation today, namely, the extent to which a trial
court's class judgment can bind-either by preclusion or injunction-
unnamed nonresident class members, thus preventing them from raising
due process challenges to the judgment in another court. After placing
the antisuit injunction and preclusion issues in the context of recent
class action and related developments, Professor Monaghan discusses the
Supreme Court's 1985 decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts
and its applicability to these issues. In particular, Professor Monaghan
criticizes reading Shutts' "implied consent" rationale as turning entirely
on class members'failure to opt out of the class action, and using that
failure as a basis for an antisuit injunction against nonresident class
members. Absent minimum contact, Shutts requires, inter alia, ade-
quate representation at all times in order to establish in personam juris-
diction over nonresident class members. That issue can always be raised
in another firum. In a class action universe that includes races tojudg-
ment and reverse auctions, this rule is desirable. In the absence of a
legislative reform, Professor Monaghan concludes that non-party, non-
resident class members must remain free to challenge, on due process
grounds, otherwise preclusive judgments in a forum of their choosing.
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INTRODUCTION
Class actions occupy an uneasy place in American jurisprudence.'
They are a salient exception to the otherwise deeply ingrained rule that a
person is bound by judicial proceedings only if he or she is a party or in
privity with a party thereto. 2 Traditional understanding holds, however,
that the class action judgment (the F1 judgment, to use the conventional
terminology) bars subsequent litigation only if the judgment satisfies due
process.3 Thus, F2 must inquire into such matters as adequacy of class
1. Once enmeshed in a class action, class members cannot shape their own claims,
and their individual rights to participate in the class proceeding are quite limited. As
Professor Issacharoff observes, an attorney-client relationship is often established without
any individual contact; courts determine whether class counsel provided representation
"good enough" to bind the class member; and that determination concerning adequacy of
representation is based upon "representations of counsel who have little if any connection
to [the) parties to be bound." Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. Davis L.
Rev. 805, 805 (1997). Frequently, individual class members simply become an invisible
part of the "inventory" of the representative plaintiff's counsel. Particularly in the mass
and toxic tort area, modem class action practice poses formidable challenges to long-
standing conceptions of individual client control, or at least an individual's right to be
heard in matters that purport to extinguish his rights. See Patrick Woolley, Rethinking the
Adequacy of Adequate Representation, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 571, 580-81, 604 n.152 (1997)
(noting absent class members' limited rights to participate). To be sure, our legal system
may no longer be fully able to afford such conceptions.
2. "It is a general principle of general application in Anglo-American jurisprudence
that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not
designated as a party...." Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940). Nevertheless, "[w]e
have recognized an exception to the general rule when, in certain limited circumstances, a
person, although not a party, has his interests adequately represented by someone with the
same interests who is a party." Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 n.2 (1989) (citing
Hansbeny, 311 U.S. at 41-42).
3. "A State may not grant preclusion effect in its own courts to a constitutionally
infirm judgement, and other state and federal courts are not required to accord full faith
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representation before it can accord full faith and credit to the F1
judgment.
4
In recent years, however, nationwide antisuit injunctions have be-
come an increasingly familiar feature of the class action landscape, not
only in securities and antitrust law, but also in mass and toxic tort class
actions certified under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules
23(b) (1) and (b) (3).5 Typically, an antisuit injunction prohibits all class
members from commencing or continuing litigation arising out of the
same transaction in another forum. 6 One important effect of such an
injunction is, of course, to channel all due process challenges to the class
action judgment back to F1, thereby allowing that court to retain its hold
on the underlying controversy, even in the unlikely event that it sustains a
due process challenge to its own prior proceedings.
7
The prestigious American Law Institute (ALI) has endorsed the prin-
ciple of antisuit injunctions as part of a comprehensive legislative propo-
sal designed to aggregate and consolidate similar class litigations within a
single tribunal.8 Without distinguishing between the entry of an antisuit
injunction and its enforcement, several courts believe that the existing
and credit to such ajudgement." Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 482
(1982) (citations ormitted).
4. Numerous authorities support this rule. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments
§ 42(1)(d)-(e) & cmts. (e) & (f) (1982); Richards v. Jefferson County, 116 S. Ct. 1761,
1766 (1996); Epstein I, 116 S. Ct. at 888 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Hansbeny, 311 U.S. at 41-42. The lower courts are in accord. See Epstein II, 126 F.3d
at 1245 (collecting many authorities); Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 10 F.3d 189, 200
n.7 (3d Cir. 1993) (same); see also Barney v. Holzer Clinic, Ltd., 110 F.3d 1207, 1214 n.11
(6th Cir. 1997) ("absent class member may later collaterally attack a faulty judgment by
challenging adequacy of representation").
5. See, e.g., Arnchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2242 (1997); In Re
Asbestos Litig. (Ahearn 1), 90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996), remanded sub nom. Flanagan v.
Ahearn, 117 S. Ct. 2503 (1997), reaff'd per curiam on remand, 134 F.3d 668 (Ahearn I1)
(5th Cir. 1998), cert. granted sub nom. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 66 U.S.L.W. 3799 (U.S.
June 22, 1998) (No. 97-1704).
6. For example, on August 6, 1997, the New York Times's financial pages carried a full-
page notice of a proposed settlement of a pending nationwide, opt-out securities law class
action against theJohn Hancock Insurance Company. See Notice of Proposed Settlement,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1997, at D5. The antisuit injunction's breadth is staggering. It
purports to enjoin not only all non-opting-out class members, but also "all persons from
filing, commencing or prosecuting a lawsuit as a class action on behalf of Class Members
who have not timely excluded themselves." Id. (emphasis added). Presumably, as an
attorney, this author is subject to the injunction.
7. I assume that under existing law the forum must entertain a collateral attack based
upon such alleged due process violations as inadequate representation. See In re "Agent
Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig. (Agent Orange I), 996 F.2d 1425, 1432-33 (2d Cir. 1993)
(recognizing a constitutional obligation to entertain, but rejecting on the merits, a due
process collateral attack in F1 based upon inadequate representation in a prior
settlement), cert. denied sub nom. Hartman v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 510 U.S.
1140 (1994).
8. See American Law Institute, Complex Litigation: Statutory Recommendations and
Analysis § 5.04(a) (1994) [hereinafter Complex Litigation). The proposal provides that
when actions are transferred and consolidated:
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ANTIS UJT INJUNCTIONS AND PRECLUSION
legal framework provides sufficient warrant for such injunctions in some
circumstances. 9 That belief will be reassessed in light of the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Baker v. General Motors Corp., although there,
the Court was concerned with issues of full faith and credit, not in per-
sonam jurisdicion.10 In Baker, the Court unanimously held that, in a
product liability action against General Motors, a Missouri court need not
accord full faith and credit to a nationwide Michigan antitestimonial in-
junction secured by General Motors in a Michigan court as part of a set-
tlement of the Missouri witness's own claims against General Motors. In
an elegant opinion for five members of the Court, Justice Ginsburg recog-
nized that, while the Michigan proceeding had preclusive effect between
the witness and General Motors," the Michigan court could not "control
proceedings against GM brought in other States, by other parties, assert-
ing claims the merits of which Michigan has not considered. Michigan
has no power over those parties, and no basis for commanding them to
become intervenors in the [Michigan proceeding].12 Of special interest
here, Justice Ginsburg addressed the more general issue of antisuit in-
junctions against litigants and other persons actually before Fl. Her
opinion drew a sharp distinction between issues of preclusion and direct
enforcement of the injunction itself.13 Baker v. General Motors will focus
the transferee court may enjoin transactionally related proceedings, or portions
thereof, pending in any state or federal court whenever it determines that the
continuation of those actions substantially impairs or interferes with the
consolidated actions and that an injunction would promote the just, efficient, and
fair resolution of the actions before it.
Id. For a discussion of the ALI proposal, see Edward F. Sherman, Antisuit Injunction and
Notice of Intervention and Preclusion: Complementary Devices to Prevent Duplicative
Litigation, 1995 BYU L. Rev. 925. Sherman makes clear that the ALI proposal does not
contemplate issuing antisuit injunctions as a matter of course. See id. at 932 ("If, as the
ALI proposal contemplates, antisuit injunctions may be a normal complement to
consolidation, careful scrutiny of the status of pending cases is necessary.").
9. See infra text accompanying notes 154-72, 181-201.
10. 118 S. Ct. 657 (1998).
11. See id. at 666.
12. Id. In a subsequent footnote, Justice Ginsburg added: "The Michigan judgment
is not entitled to full faith and credit... because it impermissibly interferes with Missouri's
control of litigation brought by parties who were not before the Michigan court." Id. at 667 n.12.
13. So far as preclusion was concerned, she rejected any distinction between equity
actions and other civil proceedings:
The Court has never placed equity decrees outside the full faith and credit
domain .... We see no reason why the preclusive effects of an adjudication on
parties and those 'in privity' with them, i.e., claim preclusion and issue preclusion
(res judicata and collateral estoppel), should differ depending solely upon the
type of relief sought in a civil action.
Id. at 664 (citations omitted). But to compel F2 to enforce the F1 injunction itself was a
different matter.
Full faith and credit, however, does not mean that States must adopt the practices
of other States regarding the time, manner, and mechanisms for enforcing
judgments. . . . Orders commanding action or inaction have been denied
enforcement in a sister State when they purported to accomplish an official act
1998] 1151
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attention on the full faith and credit aspects of antisuit injunctions in
class actions, that is, the extent to which even validly issued antisuit in-
junctions must or should not be given full faith and credit, or at least,
have preclusive effect in F2. But there is a far deeper issue, one logically
prior to that of full faith and credit: the scope of Fl's jurisdictional au-
thority with respect to nonresident class members in the first instance.
What is the source of existing judicial authority in any state or federal
court to bar, whether by way of preclusion or by injunction, due process
within the exclusive province of that other State or interfered with litigation over
which the ordering State had no authority.... And antisuit injunctions regarding
litigation elsewhere, even if compatible with due process as a direction constraining
parties to the decree, see Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107, 10 S. Ct. 269, 33 L. Ed.
538 (1890), in fact have not controlled the second court's actions regarding
litigation in that court.
Id. at 665 (emphasis added). In his brief opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice
Scalia also emphasized the same distinction between preclusion and direct enforcement of
the injunction: "[Elnforcement measures do not travel with sister-state judgments as
preclusive effects do." Id. at 668 (Scalia, J., concurring).
In an important footnote, however, Justice Ginsburg acknowledged that the Court, in
fact, has never authoritatively resolved the full faith and credit status of antisuit
injunctions. While the Court has "held it impermissible for a state court to enjoin a party
from proceeding in a federal court," it has not "yet ruled on the credit due to a state court
injunction barring a party from maintaining litigation in another [s]tate." Id. at 665 n.9
(emphasis added) (citations omitted) (citing Donovan v. Dallas, 377 U.S. 408 (1964)).
Justice Ginsburg, inter alia, cited her own article, see Ruth B. Ginsburg, Judgments in
Search of Full Faith and Credit: The Last-In-Time Rule for Conflicting Judgments, 82
Harv. L. Rev. 798, 823 (1969), which states that "[flederal law on antisuit injunctions
running between state courts is notably murky." Justice Ginsburg also cited an article by
Professor Reese, see Willis L. M. Reese, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Equity Decrees, 42
Iowa L. Rev. 183, 198 (1957), which urged denial of full faith and credit. The footnote also
recognized that "[s]tate courts that have dealt with the question have, in the main,
regarded antisuit injunctions as outside the full faith and credit ambit." Baker, 118 S. Ct. at
665 n.9 (citations omitted). Moreover, Justice Ginsburg recognized both that antisuit
injunctions "constraining the parties to the decree" could be "compatible with due
process," and that the Michigan "decree could operate against [the witnessJ to preclude
him from volunteering his testimony." Id. at 665, 667. Nonetheless, her opinion strongly
implies that, whatever its preclusive effect, F1 cannot directly interfere "with litigation over
which the ordering State had no authority." Id. at 665. This seems to be an extension of
her 1969 conclusion that "[t]he current state of the law, permitting the injunction to issue
but not compelling any deference outside the rendering state, may be the most reasonable
compromise between these extreme alternatives." Ginsburg, supra, at 829. Concurring,
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices O'Connor and Thomas, would have reserved
.announc[ing] an exception which denies full faith and credit based on the principle that
the prior judgment interferes with litigation pending in another jurisdiction." Baker, 118
S. Ct. at 669 (Kennedy, J., concurring). For Justice Kennedy it was enough that the
Missouri plaintiffs "were not parties to the Michigan proceedings, and nothing indicates
[that] Michigan would make the novel assertion that its earlier injunction binds
[nonparties or others] not then before [the court] or subject to itsjurisdiction." Id. at 671.
Baker's full consequences remain to be worked out. Can F1 hold a litigant before it in
contempt for "voluntarily" litigating in F2 when F2 permits such litigation? If so, what
would be the measure of damages? Given the Court's sharp distinction between
preclusion and direct enforcement of the injunction itself, to what extent can F1 preclude
issues in F2 even when it cannot halt the F2 proceeding?
[Vol. 98:11481152
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challenges in F2 by nonresident class members with whom F1 lacks mini-
mum contacts? While F1 may have sufficient "in personam jurisdiction"
to preclude the underlying substantive claims of such class members,
14
prohibiting due process challenges outside F1, whether by way of preclu-
sion or injunction, raises fundamentally different issues. 15
Focusing on the position of absent, nonresident class members, this
Article will address some of the pertinent preclusion and antisuit injunc-
tion issues in the class action context.' 6 Subject to some important ex-
ceptions, I argue that existing law does not permit F1 (by way of preclu-
sion or injunction) to bar nonresident class members from litigating their
substantive claims (individually or on behalf of a class) in F2, if F2 finds
that the F1 class action judgment violated due process.' 7 This is not be-
cause of limitations inherent in the Full Faith and Credit Clause even
with respect to F1 proceedings admittedly "compatible with due pro-
cess."' 8 Rather, it is because in the absence of minimum contacts be-
tween the forum and the nonresident class members, an F1 proceeding
that seeks to enjoin or preclude due process challenges outside of F1 is
not "compatible" with existing due process limits on state court in per-
sonam jurisdiction. 19 Perhaps nonresident class members in a class ac-
tion are not precisely strangers to class litigation as were the Missouri
plaintiffs in Baker. On many levels, however, these "inventory plaintiffs"
20
14. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811 (1985) ("In this case we
hold that a forum State may exercise jurisdiction over the claim of an absent class-action
plaintiff, even though that plaintiff may not possess the minimum contacts with the forum
which would support personal jurisdiction over a defendant.").
15. While the statement in Baker that "Michigan has no power over these [Missouri]
parties and no basis commanding them to become intervenors in the [Michigan dispute],"
Baker, 118 S. Ct. at 666, was made in regard to nonparties to the F1 litigation, I will argue
that the Court's statement is fully applicable to, to take a salient example, the thousands
upon thousands of "inventory" plaintiffs involuntarily conscripted into a class. I do not
include here another set of inventory plaintiffs-those who "hire" counsel to represent
their claims in mass and toxic tort cases, even though they, too often, also become a part of
the class counsel's inventory.
16. Many of the arguments advanced in this Article may under existing law also apply
to in-state class members and nonresident class members with in-state contacts.
17. Compare Baker, 118 S. Ct. at 670 (KennedyJ, concurring) ("And whether or not
an injunction is enforceable in another State on its own terms, the courts of a second state
are required to honor its issue preclusive effects.").
18. Id. at 669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
19. Similar limits exist on F1 federal court proceedings because Rule 4(k) (1) (A) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally limits a federal court's in personam
jurisdiction to that of the state court next door. Rule 4(k)(1) states, "[s]ervice of a
summons or filing a waiver of service is effective to establish jurisdiction over the person of
a defendant
(A) who could be subjected to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in
the state in which the district court is located ....
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1).
20. Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2239 (1997). See supra note 15.
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have a strong resemblance to such complete strangers. 2' All too often,
absent class members are simply faceless and fungible integers in class-
counsel's huge warehouse. 22 Notice of the pending class action or of its
settlement is not legally the equivalent of a summons to appear.23 In-
deed, as a factual matter, such notices are consciously designed to en-
courage nonappearance. 24 And under existing conceptions of in per-
sonam jurisdiction, these absent, nonresident class members cannot be
made the equivalent of parties for the purpose of cutting off due process
challenges in F2.25 Given the current absence of a comprehensive coor-
dinating mechanism for consolidating multiple class actions and the dan-
gers of races to judgment and of "reverse auctions,"26 I believe that this
limitation on existing judicial authority is generally desirable. However,
no blanket judicial resolution of this issue will resolve all forms of class
action abuse. To the extent that channeling injunctions are unavailable,
migratory settler problems will remain unaddressed. Only a comprehen-
sive legislative solution can turn the conflicting interests and incentives in
the class action context into a coherent legal regime.
Part I of this Article places the issues of antisuit injunctions and pre-
clusion in the context of recent class action developments. Part II focuses
on Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts27 and the considerable uncertainty it has
created. This Axticle argues that whether Shutts is read as a case of im-
21. See Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 823 (noting the considerable similarities between
strangers to the litigation and absent class members). Indeed, Baker suggests a similar
conclusion with respect to absent resident class members who have not been formally
joined as a party. See 118 S. Ct. at 666 n.11.
22. See Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 805. As noted earlier, their rights to participation
are virtually nonexistent.
23. A class action notice is not equivalent to a summons under Rule 4, Fed. R. Civ. P.
4, or its state law counterparts. A summons issues to defendants and certain plaintiffs
joined as such under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19. See Chase Nat'l Bank v. City of Norwalk, 291 U.S.
431, 441 (1934), quoted with approval in Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 763 (1989)
("Unless duly summoned to appear in a legal proceeding, a person not a privy may rest
assured that a judgment recovered therein will not affect his legal rights."). See also
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 808, 810 (1985) (contrasting the legal
position of the "defendant summoned by a plaintiff [and] faced with the full powers of the
forum State to render judgment against it" with the absent class member who, "[u]nlike a
defendant in a normal civil suit.., is not required to do anything.").
24. Under current practice, the distinction between formal process and notice reflects
an important reality. See Arthur R Miller and David Crumpp, Jurisdiction and Choice of
Law in Multistate Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 Yale LJ. 1, 17 (1986)
(class action notices "are notoriously poorly understood, and lay recipients may be
tempted to throw them away because they give the false impression that legal effects can be
avoided by inaction"); see also text accompanying notes 173-174.
25. The Supreme Court has noted in Richards v. Jefferson County, 116 S. Ct. 1761
(1996), a case involving only in-state members, that under the law a person "'is not bound
by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to
which he has not been made a party by service of process.'" Id. at 1765-66 (quoting
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940)).
26. See infra text accompanying notes 32-33.
27. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
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plied consent or fundamental fairness, the scope of in personam jurisdic-
tion it countenances over nonresident class members lacking minimum
contact with the forum is both limited and conditional. Whether by way
of preclusion or antisuit injunction, F1 cannot prevent nonappearing,
nonresident class members from raising due process challenges in F2.
Part III focuses on and criticizes three Third Circuit decisions that ignore
the requirement of ensuring adequate representation "at all times" and
misunderstand Shutts's "implied consent" rationale as requiring no more
than a nonresident class member's failure to opt out. Part IV explores
three alternative routes to in personam jurisdiction over nonresident
class members-the All Writs Act, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and a
revised preclusion doctrine-that, to the extent to which they can be in-
voked, could effectively bar due process challenges outside of Fl. Finally,
the Conclusion calls for both a clearer judicial understanding of the cur-
rent law on preclusion and antisuit injunctions, and congressional reform
to curtail class action litigation abuse if the law is to permit Fl to preclude
or enjoin due process challenges by nonresident class members in F2.
I. PRECLUSION AND ANTisurr INJUNCTIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF RECENT
CLAss AcrION DEVELOPMENTS
The class action litigation explosion beginning in the late 1970s has
attracted considerable attention, much of it concerning abuses, real or
perceived, of the class action mechanism. 28 The allegedly exploitative na-
ture of some plaintiff class actions has been a matter of long-standing
concern that has drawn congressional scrutiny in the securities area.29
More recently, however, concern has turned to the danger of manipula-
tion of the class action mechanism by defendants. 30 When faced with
large, independently viable individual claims, many defendants welcome
28. Complex litigation, of which class actions are the salient example, has been the
dominant focus of civil procedure for at least the past decade. See, e.g., Jay Tidmarsh, Civil
Procedure: The Last Ten Years, 46 J. Legal Educ. 503 (1996) (describing the impact of
complex litigation on "routine" litigation).
29. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat.
737 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), amends both the Securities Act of 1933
and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Since the federal legislation applies only in
federal courts, it has not been as effective as Congress envisioned. Legislation is now
pending in Congress to correct that deficiency. See Rachel Witmer, Congress Focuses on
Closing "Loophole" in 1995 Act Barring Vexatious Class Suits, 66 U.S.L.W. 2131, 2131
(Sept. 9, 1997). More recently, the proposed Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act
of 1997 vests exclusive jurisdiction over securities litigation that arises out of nationally
traded securities in the federal courts. See Rachel Witmer, Bill to Federalize Securities
Class Actions Reported to Senate by Banking Committee, 66 U.S.L.W. 2669 (May 5, 1998).
30. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Corruption of the Class Action: The New
Technology of Collusion, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 851, 851 (1995) ("[It is increasingly the
corporate defendant that wishes to be sued in a class action and-with the help of a
friendly plaintiffs' attorney-that often actively arranges for such a suit to be brought by a
nominal plaintiff."); John Leubsdorf, Co-Opting the Class Action, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 1222,
1225 (1995) (analyzing how defendant can manipulate class actions).
1998] 1155
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class action suits as a vehicle for limiting overall liability, sometimes at
bargain-basement prices. 3 1 Indeed, in a world of multiple nationwide
class actions, defendants may effectively pick the class counsel by con-
ducting a "reverse auction" in which they settle with the counsel offering
the best terms.3 2 These auctions have been aptly described as a "full bore
race to the bottom."
33
A. The Changed Landscape: Two Important Developments
The concern over class action abuse has greatly intensified as a result
of two important developments. The first is the emergence of multistate
and nationwide state court damage class actions. In Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Shutts, the Supreme Court rejected a due process, in personamjurisdic-
tional challenge to the certification in Kansas of a nationwide plaintiffs'
class action for damages involving delayed interest on royalty payments
on natural gas leases. 34 A unanimous Court concluded that the
Fourteenth Amendment imposes no absolute bar to such actions involv-
ing the claims of nonresident class members lacking minimum contacts
with the forum. Nonetheless, if the forum state wishes to bind an absent
plaintiff concerning a claim for money damages or similar relief, the
Court stated that the state must accord "minimal procedural due process
protection"3 5 :
[t]he plaintiff must receive notice plus an opportunity to be
heard and participate in the litigation, whether in person or
through counsel.... Additionally, ... due process requires at a
minimum that an absent plaintiff be provided with an opportu-
31. See the testimony of Professor John C. Coffee, Jr., describing various forms of
egregiously "cheap" class action settlements whose primary benefits inure to defendants
and settling counsel. The testimony was given on October 30, 1997, before the
subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts of the Senate Judiciary
Committee (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Coffee, Testimony]. The
gap between the interests of class counsel and those of the class members in damage cases
has, of course, long been well understood. Class action lawyers have been described as
"lawyer-entrepreneur[s]." See Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation,
Deterrence, and Conflict of Interest, 4J. Legal Stud. 47, 61 (1975). See generallyJohn C.
Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and
Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 877 (1987) (noting that economic
self-interest of plaintiffs' attorneys causes conflict with clients' interests in class action
litigation).
32. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action,
95 Colum. L. Rev. 1343, 1354 (1995) ("At its worst, this process can develop into a reverse
auction, with the low bidder among the plaintiffs' attorneys winning the right to settle with
the defendant."); see also In re Asbestos Litig. (Ahearn 1), 90 F.3d 963, 995 (5th Cir. 1996)
(Smith, J., dissenting) (questioning "for whom counsel really worked"). Informal judicial
cooperation in this context has proved to be quite problematic. See Francis E. McGovern,
Rethinking Cooperation Among Judges in Mass Tort Litigation, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1851,
1852 (1997).
33. Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 813.
34. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
35. Id. at 811.
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nity to remove himself from the class by executing and re-
turning an 'opt out' or 'request for exclusion' form to the court.
Finally the Due Process Clause of course requires that the
named plaintiff at all times adequately represent the interests of
the absent class members.
3
Given Kansas's scant prelitigation contact with the relevant events, how-
ever-"over 99% of the gas leases and some 97% of the plaintiffs in the
case had no apparent connection to the State of Kansas except for th [e]
lawsuit"37 -the Shutts Court seemed wholly unconcerned with the moni-
toting or participation burdens placed on nonresident class members in
a legal universe of multiple state (and federal) damage class actions, race-
to-judgments, and reverse-auctions.
38
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Epstein (Epstein 1) displayed a simi-
lar lack of concern.3 9 Without dissent on the point, the Court put aside
questions of adequate representation and permitted a state trial court to
compromise federal claims that it could not adjudicate-those claims
were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts-and thereby
precluded a pending federal class action appeal.
40
36. Id. at 811-12.
37. Id. at 815. Indeed, the class certified also included residents of foreign countries.
See id. at 815-16 n.6.
38. Although the opinion does not say so, perhaps the Court's hospitableness to state
court class actions for money damages was partly due to the fact that federal courts have no
jurisdiction over diversity-based class actions with damage claims below the jurisdictional
amount. Shutts itself could not have been maintained as a diversity suit because, until
recently, all members of the class, not simply the representative parties, had to satisfy the
jurisdictional amount under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, now $75,000. See Zahn v. International
Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 294-95 (1973); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 338 (1969). Zahn
seems to have been inadvertently overruled by amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b). See
Free v. Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d 524, 527-29 (5th Cir. 1995); see alsoJoel E. Tasca, Comment,
Judicial Interpretation of the Effect of the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute on the
Complete Amount in Controversy Rule: A Case for Plain Meaning Statutory Construction,
46 Emory L.J. 435 (1995) (discussing possibility that § 1367(b) overruled Zahn). But even
if Zahn has been overruled, cases like Shutts and Snyder are difficult to maintain in federal
court because the representative parties must satisfy the jurisdictional amount. See Snyder,
394 U.S. at 336. Moreover, in Rule 23(b) (3) class actions, the Court has required that the
representative plaintiffs shoulder the cost of providing individual notice to all reasonably
identifiable class members, a requirement that functions as a strong deterrent to bringing
such actions. See, e.g., Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 349 (1978);
Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178-79 (1974). In the settlement class action
context, it is common for the defendant to shoulder notice costs.
39. 516 U.S. 367 (1996). See also In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel
Tank Prods. Liab. Litig. (GM Trucks fl), 134 F. 3d 133, 142 (3d Cir. 1998) (suggesting that
the Supreme Court might be "disturbed by what Matsushita has wrought" in "facilitatting]
an end run" around a Multi-District Litigation (MDL) proceeding in a state court).
40. The claims arose under the Securities Exchange Act, and accordingly, could only
be litigated in the federal courts. See Epstein I, 516 U.S. at 370. The Supreme Court
majority did not even mention that the state court had approved the compromise even
though it had observed that the benefits to the class were "meager" and that "suspicions [of
collusion] abound." Id. at 393.
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The second and perhaps most important recent class action develop-
ment is the expanding practice of certifying classes for settlement pur-
poses only, i.e., if the court rejects the proposed settlement, the class re-
mains uncertified. 4' The special dangers inherent in such limited
certifications were finally addressed by the Supreme Court last term in
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor.42 There, the Court noted that, with less
information about the class, the judge is less able to guard against abuses
such as collusion, individual settlements, and buy-offs. 43 One solution to
these dangers would be to ban the certification of classes for settlement
purposes only. Indeed, such certification does seem impermissible under
the language of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and its
state rule counterparts." Amchem Products, however, did not adopt such a
strong position. Instead, the Court attempted to mitigate the dangers
associated with settlement-only classes by prohibiting the use of a measur-
ably lower standard when certifying such classes. 45 Rejecting an argu-
ment that a "fairness" hearing was an adequate substitute for inquiry into
adequacy of representation, the Court said:
[I]f a fairness inquiry under Rule 23(e) controlled certification,
eclipsing Rule 23(a) and (b), and permitting class designation
despite the impossibility of litigation, both class counsel and
court would be disarmed. Class counsel confined to settlement
negotiations could not use the threat of litigation to press for a
better offer, see Coffee, Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass
Tort Class Action, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1343, 1379-80 (1995), and
the court would face a bargain proffered for its approval without
benefit of adversarial investigation, see, e.g., Kamilewicz v. Bank of
Boston Cop., 100 F.3d 1348, 1352 (CA7 1996) (Easterbrook, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (parties "may even
put one over on the court, in a staged performance"), cert. de-
nied, 117 S. Ct. 1569 (1997).46
41. On the difficulty in pinning down the frequency of this practice, see Judith
Resnick, Litigating and Settling Class Actions: The Prerequisites of Entry and Exit, 30 U.C.
Davis L. Rev. 835, 849 (1997) (one limited study indicates a figure of 39%).
42. 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
43. See id. at 2248-49.
44. See Comment, Back to the Drawing Board: The Settlement Class Action and the
Limits of Rule 23, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 828 (1996).
45. See Amcz.nn Prods., 117 S. Ct. at 2247-48. The Court recognized that settlement-
only classes assuaged manageability concerns.
46. Id. at 2248-49. Several lower courts had voiced similar concerns even before
Amchem Products was decided. See, e.g., In Re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel
Tank Prods. Liab. Litig. (GM Trucks 1), 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
88 (1995), on further proceedings, GM Trucks H, 134 F.3d 133 (3d Cir. 1998). See also
General Motors Corp. v. Bloyed, 916 S.W.2d 949, 954 (Tex. 1996) ("Settlement classes...
raise special concerns."). But see Resnick, supra note 41, at 843-45 (cautioning against
judging settlement.-only classes on the basis of a few highly visible suits).
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B. Due Process Challenges and the Problematic Expansion of Fl 's Jurisdiction
Recent academic and judicial concern with potential class action
abuse has been targeted towards attempts to employ the class action
mechanism in the area of mass and toxic torts.47 In particular, this con-
cern has centered on a proposal to amend Rule 23 so that (b) (3) classes
certified for settlement only need not satisfy (b) (3)'s predominance
requirement.
48
But little attention has been paid to another potential source of
abuse in the class action mechanism: the expansion of Fl's jurisdiction
to preclude due process challenges in F2, whether by way of preclusion or
injunction.49 In purporting to prevent absent class members from insti-
47. For examples of academic concern regarding the difficulties of managing class
actions in such cases, see the extensive bibliography collected in David L. Shapiro, Class
Actions: The Class As Party And Client, 73 Notre Dame L. Rev. 913, 914-16 n.2 (1998).
For expression of such concern in the judicial context, see e.g., Georgine v. Amchem
Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 628-29 (3d Cir. 1996), aff'd, Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 117 S.
Ct. 2231 (1997); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 166-67 (2d Cir.
1987). More importantly, consolidation and settlement in the mass and toxic tort area
raise fundamental issues on such matters as due process, the nature ofjudicial power, and
federalism. See infra note 73.
48. However, Amchem Products held that a "settlement only" class must satisfy Rule
23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement. 117 S. Ct. at 2246; see also supra text
accompanying notes 42-46. As the Court noted, the proposal to eliminate this
requirement has received widespread criticism. See id. at 2247. For an especially
penetrating criticism, see Paul D. Carrington & Derek P. Apanovitch, The Constitutional
Limits of Judicial Rulemaking The Legitimacy of Mass-Tort Settlements Negotiated
Under Federal Rule 23, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 461 (1997). The authors conclude that "[ilt is
quite possible that the proposed [change] would violate every constitution in the world."
Id. at 476. In Aheam , a per curiam court decided that predominance was not required in
a (b) (1) toxic tort proceeding, and thus approved, over a powerful dissent byJudge Smith,
the settlement of a "futures only" asbestos class action. See In re Asbestos Litig. (Ahearn
,U), 134 F.3d 668, 670 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. granted sub nom. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 66
U.S.L.W. 3799 (U.S. June 22, 1998) (No. 97-1704). The majority seemed completely
unaware of the fact that predominance may be constitutionally required by the Due
Process Clause in order to ensure adequate representation. For a rare defense of the
proposed new rule, see Eric D. Green, What Will We Do When Adjudication Ends? We'll
Settle in Bunches: Bringing Rule 23 into the Twenty-First Century, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1773
(1997) [hereinafter Green, What]. Professor Greene advocates casting aside traditional
conceptions of due process and judicial power. For him, this is a new evolutionary stage.
To borrow the author's words, this is the "Age of Settlement," and older conceptions of the
litigation process, the nature ofjudicial power, and the meaning of due process must be
discarded. See id. at 1774; see also Eric D. Green, Advancing Individual Rights Through
Group Justice, 30 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 791 (1997) (arguing in favor of proposed rule that
would allow certification for settlement purposes only) [hereinafter Green, Advancing].
49. As Baker v. General Motors reaffirimed, state court injunctions enjoining pending or
future federal in personam litigation are clearly void on federalism grounds, even as to
parties to the F1 proceeding. See Baker v. General Motors Corp., 118 S. Ct. 657, 665 n.9
(1998) (quoting Court's previous holding in Donovan v. City of Dallas that it is
impermissible "for a state court to enjoin a party from proceeding in a federal court");
Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 413 (1964) ("[S] tate courts are completely without
power to restrain federal-court ... in personam actions."); Charles A. Wright, Law of
Federal Courts 296 (5th ed. 1994) ("Since the states cannot limit the jurisdiction of the
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tuting or continuing an F2 proceeding, Fl's antisuit injunction effectively
transfers all due process challenges back to itself.50
In a class action universe in which similar claims are not consoli-
dated in a single forum, the problem of "distant-forum" abuse may be
exacerbated to the extent that Fl can effectively bar due process chal-
lenges in F2. Absent, nonresident class members must travel to F1 and
incur legal expenses in order to monitor or participate in a proceeding in
a distant and unfamiliar forum to protect his or her interests ade-
quately.5' In a world of multiple class actions, the dangers of races to
federal courts, they cannot enjoin proceedings in federal courts, except to protect the
jurisdiction of the state court over property in its custody or under its control.").
But what about Fl's power to preclude in situations other than those covered by
Donovan? Prior to Baker, judicial and academic attention on this issue concentrated on
such formidable questions as whether the Anti-Injunction Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994),
bars federal court antisuit injunctions against pending state proceedings. The relevant
cases are collected in Sherman, supra note 8, at 935-48. For a general discussion of the
Anti-Injunction Act, see Fallon et al., Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the
Federal System 1189-1210, 1205-26 (4th ed. 1996 & Supp. 1997) [hereinafter Hart &
Wechsler]. Suffice it to note here that the act has so far not proved a barrier when the
federal court class action was near final disposition, or when the F1 court was seeking to
protect a final judgment that had erected a private administrative "agency" for the
payment of claims. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig. (Agent Orange 1), 996
F.2d 1425, 1432 (2d Cir. 1993); Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 10 F.3d 189, 203 (3d Cir.
1993) ("Hence the prospect of settlement was indeed imminent, as in other cases in which
federal courts have issued injunctions."). According to Hart and Wechsler, there is no
.class action exception to the Anti-Injunction Act." Hart & Wechsler, supra, at 1205. In
general, lower courts have relied on the "in aid of [its] jurisdiction" exception of the
Supreme Court's language preventing "a state court from so interfering with a federal
court's consideration or disposition of a case as to seriously impair the federal court's
flexibility and authority to decide that case." Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood
of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 295 (1970). Reliance on Atlantic Coast is problematic,
however. In Atlantic Coast, the Court believed that parallel proceedings, even when federal
jurisdiction is exclusive, do not ordinarily implicate the "in aid of" exception. Id. at
295-96. Subsequently, the Court said that it had "never viewed parallel in personam actions
as interfering with [the district court'sjurisdiction]." Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433
U.S. 623, 642 (1977). Hart and Wechsler seek refuge in an "in rem" analogy. See Hart &
Wechsler, supra, at 1204-06. Leaving aside arguendo "limited fund" cases, class actions
seeking damages are in personam. See, e.g., Ahearn 11, 134 F.3d at 673 (Smith, J.,
dissenting). Recently, in GM Trucks II, the Third Circuit suggested that the Anti-Injunction
Act may be a far more formidable barrier than recent cases had implied. See GM Trucks 11,
134 F.3d at 143-45. The court noted that the "'typical application of the [in and of its
jurisdiction] exception has been in removal cases.., and in in rem cases'.... Carlough...
fashioned a third, and narrow [exception] ... where a settlement was imminent," where
the federal court "had already expended considerable time and resources ... and where
the pending state action threatened to derail the provisional settlement." Id. at 145
(citations omitted) (citing Carlough, 10 F. 3d at 204).
50. I proceed on the premise that the F1 court would consider the merits of a due
process challenge. See, e.g., Agent Orange 1, 996 F.2d at 1432-34. Indeed, in my view, F1
courts are constitutionally obliged to do so under existing law.
51. See Note, Steven T.O. Cottreau, The Due Process Right To Opt Out of Class
Actions, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 480, 487-90 (1998) (describing distant forum abuse problems
because of the nonresident class members' lack of relationship with the forum). The
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judgment and reverse auctions are considerable. Accordingly, by way of
either preclusion or antisuit injunction, giving the F1 court the authority
to bar due process challenges in F2 significantly increases the risks of
class action abuse. F2's traditional checking function, however minimal,
to ensure that an F1 proceeding comports with due process, is elimi-
nated. That is a high price. As Judge Becker said in Real Estate Title:
Ever since Hansbery v. Lee was decided in 1940, collateral attacks
have been considered to be a necessary part of the class action
scheme. Rather than threatening the vitality of the class action
mechanism... [collateral attack] is integral to the constitution-
ality of the class action procedure.
52
Due process concerns are particularly acute in settlement class actions,
given the danger that the settlement court will lack information sufficient
to judge adequacy of representation.
5 3
Even prior to Baker v. General Motors, antisuit injunctions invited an
examination of the current understanding of the relationship between
class actions and concepts of in personamjurisdiction. The Court's opin-
ions have consistently recognized that the unnamed class members are
just that: "absent. '5 4 Is there, however, an emerging conception that, un-
like the Missouri plaintiffs in Baker, even absent, nonresident class mem-
bers are somehow sufficiently "present" so that at least in some circum-
stances (and perhaps in many more than was previously thought) they
now have a legal status comparable to that of named class representa-
tives? 55 Or do conceptualizations of this nature-party v. non-party-no
longer really matter because evolving notions of "fundamental fairness"
now sometimes permit enjoining, or at least precluding, absent nonresi-
dent class plaintiffs from litigating in F2? Either mode of analysis would
burden on the absent class member is closely akin to a compulsory intervention
requirement. American law generally does not require compulsory intervention by absent
class members in a lawsuit. See Epstein v. MCA, Inc. (Epstein fl), 126 F.3d 1235, 1243-45
(9th Cir. 1997) (absent class members are under no duty to intervene or to monitor the
proceedings); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (11th Cir. 1989).
52. In re Real Estate Title and Settlement Servs. Antitrust Litig. (Real Estate Title), 869
F.2d 760, 769 (3d Cir. 1989); see also Miller & Crumpp, supra note 24, at 52 ("One way to
view Shutts is as a case about distant forum abuse. The right to opt out is essential to the
Supreme Court's inference of consent, and that reasoning, in tum, is essential to the
Court's validation of jurisdiction over members who have no affiliation with a distant
forum.").Judge Becker's opinion does not make reference to this language in GM TrucksHI
at points where it might have been invoked.
53. See Amchem Prods., 117 S. CL at 2248-49. See also supra text accompanying notes
42-46.
54. In Shutts, for example, the Court uses the term four times in a single page. See
Philips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 810 (1985); see also Richards v. Jefferson
County, 116 S. Ct. 1767, 1767 (1996) (describing petitioners, unnamed class members who
did not receive notice in prior class action, as "absent parties").
55. Shutts states that an "absent" plaintiff is not "fully a party in the traditional sense,"
472 U.S. at 808 (emphasis added), language that might suggest that he or she may be partly
a party. See id. at 805.
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transform long-standing understandings of what it means for absent class
members to be "bound" by a class action judgment.
Baker v. General Motors simply sets the stage for further inquiry into
these difficult questions in the class action context. That decision, I be-
lieve, will quickly shift focus from issues concerning the compulsive effect
of the F1 antisuit injunction against nonresident class members to the
question of the extent to which F1 can preclude issues in F2. The under-
lying issues center on due process, not full faith and credit. This under-
standing takes us back to Shutts, because Shutts was all about the condi-
tions necessary for the existence of in personam jurisdiction sufficient to
preclude the claims of absent, nonresident class members.
U. SHz-r-rS AND NATIONWIDE STATE COURT CLASs AcTIONS
A. Background Developments
While Shuts is the starting point with respect to the legal status of
absent class members,56 it is best understood against several important
background developments, which both give rise to and shed light on the
problematic extrapolation of the Shutts analysis in the class action con-
text. First, discussions of in personamjurisdiction have been overwhelm-
ingly concerned with the extent to which defendants can be hauled into
distant forums.57 Current jurisprudence emphasizes notions of funda-
mental fairness that, in turn, largely focus on a defendant's prelitigation
affiliation with a forum or a defendant's consent.58 These requirements
protect the "personal liberty interest" of a defendant from the "travail of
defending in a distant forum."59 Federalism concerns, that is, the extent
to which the federal structure of the government requires that the states,
including their courts, "stay at home,"60 are, at least superficially, no
longer seen as an independent constraint upon the reach of state court
56. Prior thereto, the Court was concerned with the issue of when representative suits
bound absent members of the plaintiff class, see, e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-44
(1940). This is an issue that still arises. See, e.g., Jefferson County, 116 S. Ct. at 1765-66;
Epstein II, 126 F.3d at 1242-48.
57. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Class Actions, Personal Jurisdiction, and Plaintiffs'
Due Process: Implications for Mass Tort Litigation, 28 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 871, 873 (1995).
58. See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 807-08. Ideas of fairness here may be in flux. See
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 508 (1996), criticized by Note, Civil Procedure-PersonaJurisdiction-Second
Circuit Applies "Reasonableness" Test for General Personal Jurisdiction, 110 Harv. L. Rev.
1328 (1997) (refusing to uphold "general"jurisdiction over a multi-state defendant when
the underlying controversy had no connection with the forum); Symposium, Fifty Years of
International Shoe: The Past and Future of Personal Jurisdiction, 28 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 513
(1995) (analyzing the current status of Supreme Court doctrines).
59. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 807.
60. But see Baker v. General Motors Corp., 118 S. Ct. 657, 663-65 (1998) (addressing
the issue of full faith and credit to injunctions).
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adjudicatory authority.61 So far as plaintiffs are concerned, the Court
had, prior to Shutts, repeatedly rejected arguments that a plaintiff must
have some minimal contact with the forum.62 "Prior to Shutts.... plain-
tiffs' contacts [with the forum] were only viewed through the lens of de-
fendants' procedural due process rights."
63
Second, considerable uncertainty existed in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries over the preclusive effect of class actions. Sometimes
they were allowed to have such effect; sometimes they were not.64 This
disarray continued even after the codes took over the equity practice.
65
The 1938 amendments to the Federal Rules sought to reorder the legal
61. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guine, 456
U.S. 694, 703 n.10 (1982) ("The restriction on state sovereign power... must be seen as
ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause.
That Clause is the only source of the personal jurisdiction requirement and the Clause
itself makes no mention of federalism concerns."). This statement has been described as
"historically, analytically, and functionally incorrect," FlemingJames et al., Civil Procedure
§ 2.4, at 60 (4th ed. 1992) [hereinafterJaines & Hazard]. For similar criticism, see Martin
H. Redish & Eric J. Beste, Personal Jurisdiction and the Global Resolution of Mass Tort
Litigation: Defining the Constitutional Boundaries, 28 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 917, 933-40
(1995). The authors argue that "both in its initial formulation . .. and its subsequent
elaboration ... the purposeful availment limitation was expressly derived from notions of
interstate sovereignty, which the Court chose to incorporate into the Due Process Clause."
Id. at 945.
Albeit an "absent plaintiffs" case, Shutts itself illustrates the demise of overt federalism
concerns. The Court stated that due process "represents a restriction on judicial power
not as a matter of [state] sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty." Shutts, 472 U.S.
at 807; see Woolley, supra note 1, at 577-78 n.32. This is an odd statement because Shutts
then went on to impose essentially federalism-based limits on the state court's choice-of-law
rules, insisting that no state interest existed sufficient to warrant application of state
substantive law to the vast bulk of the leases. 472 U.S. at 814-23. The emphasis on state
interests, however, has played no comparable role in the law of personal jurisdiction.
According to Linda Silberman, "although dicta in several Supreme Court [personal
jurisdiction] cases allude[ ] to the importance of such state assertions of interests, the
Court does not seem inclined to move in that direction." Linda J. Silberman, "Two
Cheers" For International Shoe (And None For Asahi): An Essay on the Fiftieth Anniversary
of International Shoe, 28 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 755, 758 (1995). For an illuminating and
comprehensive treatment of the historical and contemporary "federalism" dimensions of
in personam jurisdiction, see Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism
in the Law of PersonalJurisdiction, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 689 (1987). Professor Stein argues that
"assertions ofjurisdiction, as exercises of power, ought to reflect the general limits on state
sovereignty inherent in a federal system." Id. at 689.
62. See, e.g., Caldor v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788 (1984) ("The plaintiff's lack of
'contacts' will not defeat otherwise proper jurisdiction."); see also Mullenix, supra note 57,
at 885-93 (describing the case law).
63. Mullenix, supra note 57, at 893.
64. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940) ("[T]o an extent not precisely
defined by judicial opinion, the judgment in a 'class' or 'representative' suit... may bind
members of the class or those represented who were not made parties to it."). See also 7A
Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1751 (1981) [hereinafter
Wright & Miller] (noting the doctrinal uncertainty prior to Hansberry).
65. For a brief and illuminating discussion, see James & Hazard, supra note 61,
§ 10.21, at 560. The authors observe:
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landscape of class actions by fashioning preclusion doctrine based upon
certain 'jural" relationships.66 In Amchem Products, the Court noted that
the 1966 revision of Rule 23 abandoned that approach. Instead, it substi-
tuted functional categories for legal ones, and it allowed class action suits
for purely legal claims, including damage actions based solely upon com-
mon questions of law or fact, to have preclusive effect.67 Most states now
have class action provisions patterned on the federal rule, and the gen-
eral assumption is that, due process considerations aside, preclusion will
occur if the terms of the rule are satisfied. 68
Third, Amchem Products considerably understates matters when it de-
scribes the lower courts' use of the class action mechanism "to secure
their just, speedy, and inexpensive determination" as "adventuresome.
'69
The "framers" of Rule 23 did not envision the expansive interpretations
of the rule that have emerged, a point frequently overlooked by lawyers
and judges in their discussion of preclusion and anti-litigation injunc-
tions.70 No draftsmen contemplated that, in mass torts, (b) (1) (B) "lim-
ited fund" classes would emerge as the functional equivalent to bank-
ruptcy by embracing "funds" created by the litigation itself;71 that (b) (2)
The uncertainty in the nineteenth century case law was compounded by a curious
combination of determinations by the U.S. Supreme Court. In 1842 the Court
promulgated Equity Rules governing the procedure in federal courts. One of
them, Rule 48, dealt with class suits. That Rule provided that when the parties
were very numerous, theirjoinder could be excused but that the "decree shall be
without prejudice to the rights and claims of all the absent parties." Only a
decade later, in Smith v. Swormstedt the Court passed on a federal class action case
with language plainly implying that absentees would be bound. Understandably,
the decisions in the federal courts thereafter were in profound confusion.
Id. at 560 (citation omitted).
66. The class action world was divided into "true," "hybrid," and "spurious" class
actions. On the nineteenth and early twentieth-century origins of this trichotomy, see
James & Hazard, supra note 61, § 10.21, at 560-61 n.21. The true class action was binding;
the hybrid class action was binding with respect to specific property; and the spurious class
action, the paradigmatic example of which was a lawsuit for money damages based upon
common questions of law and fact, was binding only for the named parties. See generally
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2245-51 (1997). Spurious class actions
were, in effect, a permissive joinder device under which a class member could join in the
litigation even if the member could not independently satisfy the requirement of complete
diversity from the defendant or defendants. See id. at 2245.
67. See id.
68. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811 (1985).
69. 117 S. Ct. at 2247 (quotations omitted).
70. For a brief account of Rule 23's expansion, see Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A.
Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59
Brook. L. Rev. 961 (1993).
71. See In reAsbestos Litig. (Ahearn 1), 90 F.3d 963, 1001-1102 & n.17 (5th Cir. 1996)
(Smith, J., dissenting); see also Michael A. Perino, Class Action Chaos? The Theory of the
Core and an Anal)sis of Opt-Out Rights in Mass Tort Class Actions, 46 Emory LJ. 85,
98-101 (1997) (describing the evolution of the (b) (1) class in the mass tort context).
Without focusing upon the action's use in mass and toxic torts, Professor Issacharoff
characterizes (b) (1) (B) actions "as the plaintiffs' interpleader-a mechanism by which to
avoid the 'run on the bank' risk when outstanding liabilities can be expected to outstrip
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class actions could provide substantial damage awards so long as the equi-
table relief "predominates";72 or finally, that there could be (b) (3) certifi-
cation of settlement-only classes for large-scale mass tort and toxic dam-
age actions,73 a phenomenon now clearly limited in the federal courts by
Amchem Products.
7 4
available assets." Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 820. In its choice of law discussion, Shutts
provides some succor to limited fund enthusiasts by stating, "there is no specific
identifiable res in Kansas, nor is there any limited amount which may be depleted before
every plaintiff is compensated." 472 U.S. at 820.
72. See Eubanks v. Billington, 110 F.3d 87, 95-96 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting dangers of
this development). "Structural" injunction suits are frequently brought under (b) (2). See
7A Wright and Miller, supra note 64, § 1775. While money may be required to effectuate
such a (b) (2) class judgment, the money is not a personal award for damages because of
prior misconduct.
73. See Carrington & Apanovitch, supra note 48, at 491 ("Assuredly, no one in 1966
considered the possibility of an action being certified as a class action for the sole purpose
of approving a settlement under that subdivision, thereby ostensibly conferring a res
judicata effect on an essentially nonjudicial resolution of the claims of thousands and even
millions of non-parties."). Classes certified for settlement only in the mass and toxic tort
context place an intolerable strain upon existing conceptions ofjudicial power. To begin
with, these classes lack a "baseline [established by the threat of litigation] by which to judge
whether or not the plaintiffi are getting a good deal." Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 811; see
also id. at 814 (describing risk of manipulation by defendants). The problems run deeper,
however. Suppose that Congress were to authorize a few lawyers, supervised by ajudge, to
resolve nationwide tort problems without any guidelines as to how funds are to be
allocated among right holders. The invalidity of such delegation would seem obvious. Yet
that is precisely what happens in many settlement classes. See Roger C. Cramton,
Individualized Justice, Mass Torts, and "Settlement Class Actions": An Introduction, 80
Cornell L. Rev. 811, 827 (1995) ("Class action settlements [in the mass tort context]
generally involve large tradeoffs in which certain valid legal claims are subordinated to
other claims."). These settlements involve the destruction of pre-existing property rights
and arguably violate the Fifth Amendment. See Carrington & Apanovitch, supra note 48,
at 469-71. Moreover, by design these settlements disregard the content of state tort law.
They are a "procedural camouflage" used to revise state substantive law, writes one of its
leading practitioners. See Jack B. Weinstein, Procedural Reform as a Surrogate for
Substantive Law Revision, 59 Brook. L. Rev. 827, 829 (1993); see also Judge Smith's dissent
in Ahearn I, 90 F.3d at 995 (criticizing the district court for "legislat[ing] a bold and novel
tort reform proposal thinly disguised as the settlement of a lawsuit"). The overall pattern
of these proceedings would dearly violate the principles of separation of powers, usurping
congressional authority, as well as the federalism principles contained in the Enabling Act
and the Rules of Decision Act. See generally, Carrington & Apanovitch, supra note 48, at
461-74 (1997) (raising points of criticism against a proposed revision of Rule 23, many of
which are applicable to existing practices). These settlements also involve judicial approval
of the creation of what are in effect private administrative agencies. See, e.g., Martha
Minow, Judge for the Situation: Judge Jack Weinstein, Creator of Temporary
Administrative Agencies, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 2010 (1997). The role ofjudges in the process
is especially problematic. See Resnick, supra note 41, at 837 ("[O]ver the past few
decades, judges have shifted roles, becoming 'managerialjudges,' 'settlementjudges,' and
one of many 'players' around a bargaining table."). See generally Peter Schuck, Agent
Orange on Trial: Mass Toxic Disasters in the Courts 241-44, 258-76 (1986) (discussing
the court's departure from a traditional judicial role in Agent Orange litigation).
74. See Green, What, supra note 48, at 1778 ("Although the majority left the door
slightly open for class action treatment of mass disaster cases (such as explosion or plane
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B. Shutts, In Personam Jurisdiction, and Procedural Due Process
Shutts is about due process limitations on state court in personam
jurisdiction over absent, nonresident class "plaintiffs."75 What is most
striking about Shutts is its deeply conservative character. Although
stressing the distinction between the positions of defendants and absent
class members, the Court's opinion is dominated by the reigning para-
digms governing the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over defend-
ants: minimum contacts or consent. Under Shutts, the preclusive effect
of a state court class action judgment over nonresident class members is
circumscribed by long held assumptions about territorial limits on state
court jurisdiction. However the case is read, Shutts recognizes only a lim-
ited and conditional jurisdiction over nonresident class members. The
right to "opt oue' is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for in per-
sonam jurisdiction. In addition, adequate representation must exist "at
all times."
76
At issue in Shutts was the preclusive effect of a nationwide state court
(b) (3) (i.e., an opt-out) class action. The state court had certified a na-
tionwide plaintiffs' class action involving delayed interest on royalty pay-
ments for natural gas leases. In what may prove to be a footnote of over-
riding significance, the Court characterized the action as involving "those
class actions which seek to bind known plaintiffs concerning claims wholly
or predominately Jbr money judgments. '77 As noted earlier, some 97 percent
of the plaintiffs had no prelitigation affiliation with the forum.
In the Supreme Court, petitioner made no challenge to the ade-
quacy of representation or class notice. Instead, petitioner argued that it
was denied due process because any state courtjudgment against nonresi-
dent class members would not have a preclusive effect.78 Nonresident
class members held property rights, 79 petitioner insisted, rights that
crash cases), it apparently slammed it shut for mass torts involving multiple impacts or
exposures."). But see In re Asbestos Litig. (Ahearn I11,134 F.3d 668 (5th Cir. 1998), cert.
granted sub nom. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 66 U.S.L.W. 3799 (U.S. June 22, 1998) ( No.
97-1704) where, in a laconic per curiam opinion, a divided panel held that (b) (1)
certifications did not need to satisfy the (b) (3) "predominance" requirement. The
majority did not discuss-in fact, it did not discuss anything-the extent to which
predominance is a requirement of due process if there is to be adequate representation by
the class representatives.
75. Its applicability to the federal courts is, as previously noted, a function of Rule
4(k) (1) (A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
76. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812.
77. Id. at 811 n.3 (emphasis added).
78. Petitioner was held to have standing to raise the issue. The Court reasoned that
the defendant had an interest in ensuring that any classwide judgment would be effective
to foreclose further litigation. See id. at 804-05. This seems to me entirely correct. See
generally Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 277 (1984)
(arguing that many third-party standing cases are, in fact, first-party standing cases).
79. Petitioner observed that:
an adversejudgment... would be every bit as onerous to an absent plaintiff as an
adverse judgmenit on the merits would be to a defendant. Thus, the same due
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could not be affected unless the absent, nonresident plaintiffs had some
prelitigation affiliation with the forum, which in this instance was lacking,
or they affirmatively consented to the suit by opting in.80
A unanimous Court rejected petitioner's attempt to analogize com-
pletely nonresident class members to defendants, pointing out the many
differences in their situations.8 1 The Court observed that, unlike a de-
fendant, an absent class plaintiff "is not required to do anything."8 2 With
"minimum procedural due process protection"8 3 in place, the absent
class member may "sit back and allow the litigation to run its course, con-
tent in knowing that there are safeguards provided for his protection."
8 4
Shutts carried uncertain implications for many nationwide state, and
because of Rule 4, federal class actions, such as suits for wholly equitable
relief, suits combining claims for substantial class damages and equitable
relief, and "limited fund" mandatory suits.85 That uncertainty resulted, at
least in part, from the Court's mixture of two closely linked but, in the
end, distinct modes of analysis-consent and fundamental fairness-and
the importance of an opt-out right in either mode of analysis. But before
examining that mixture, we must clearly identify what Shutts is about: the
process protections should apply to absent plaintiffs: [The forum] should not be
able to exert jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims unless the plaintiffs have
sufficient minimum contacts with [the forum].
Shutts, 472 U.S. at 807-08. Petitioner made no effort to address the status of in-state class
members; however, because they had not been served with process, a "consent"
determination would have been needed for them also.
80. Petitioner insisted that, "unless out-of-state plaintiffi affirmatively consent, the
[state] courts may not exert jurisdiction over their claims." 472 U.S. at 806.
81. See id. at 808-11.
82. Id. at 810. The Court noted that:
the burdens placed by a State upon an absent class-action plaintiff are not of the
same order or magnitude as those it places upon an absent defendant. An out-of-
state defendant summoned by a plaintiff is faced with the full powers of the forum
State to render judgment against it. The defendant must generally hire counsel
and travel to the forum to defend itself from the plaintiffs claim, or suffer a
defaultjudgement. The defendant may be forced to participate in extended and
often costly discovery, and will be forced to respond in damages or to comply with
some other form of remedy imposed by the court should it lose the suit. The
defendant may also face liability for court costs and attorney's fees. These
burdens are substantial, and the minimum contacts requirement of the Due
Process Clause prevents the forum State from unfairly imposing them upon the
defendant.
Id. at 808.
83. Id. at 811-12.
84. Id. at 810.
85. For example, after Shutts, may the state courts certify nationvide, mandatory
(non-opt-out) plaintiff class actions for damages such as "limited fund" classes? Shutts
itself leaves the issue open. See, e.g., Lawrence J. Restieri, Jr., Note, The Class Action
Dilemma: The Certification of Classes Seeking Equitable Relief and Monetary Damages
After Ticor Title Insur. Co. v. Brown, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 1745, 1765 n.151 (1995); Patricia




existence of in personam jurisdiction sufficient to preclude the substan-
tive claims of nonresident class members.8 6 With "minimal procedural
due process protection" in place, F1 can preclude the underlying substan-
tive claims of the nonresident class members. If viewed only in jurisdic-
tional terms, Shutts's opt-out right is limited to contexts in which F1
would not otherwise have a basis for in personam jurisdiction.8 7 Shutts
did not address the very different issue of whether the Due Process Clause
guarantees to class members an independent substantive right to opt out
of all damage claims or, at least, personal injury claims.88 Obviously, such
a right, if it exists, inheres in in-state absent class members as well as out-
of-state class members. And since the case arose in state court under state
class action law, Shutts did not address the question of whether substantial
damage claims may properly be certified outside of the federal frame-
work prescribed by Rule 23(b) (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Most importantly for our purposes, the Court did not consider whether,
with "minimal procedural due process protection[s]" in place, F1 could
do more than preclude an F2 proceeding with respect to the underlying
substantive claims of nonresident class members. The Court said,
"[a]bsent plaintiff class members are not subject to coercive or punitive
remedies. Nor will an adverse judgment typically bind an absent plaintiff
for any damages, although a valid adverse judgment may extinguish any
of the plaintiff's claims which were litigated."
8 9
Despite the Court's distinction between defendants and absent class
members, the Court's analysis drew heavily upon the standard in per-
sonam jurisdictional concepts applicable to defendants: prelitigation
contacts and implied consent. Miller and Crumpp state that, under the
Due Process Clause, "a substantial relationship [must exist] between a
86. "[T]he right to opt out enunciated in Shutts is not intended to protect.., a right
to a separate trial.... [It] is linked to personajurisdiction requirements." Woolley, supra
note 1, at 602.
87. See, e.g., White v. National Football League, 41 F.3d 402, 407 (8th Cir. 1994)
(noting that, since all plaintiffs were subject to the district court's jurisdiction, there was no
party "whose due process rights must be protected in [the Shutts] fashion"); Grimes v.
Vitalink Comm. Corp., 17 F.3d 1553, 1560 n.8 (3d Cir. 1994) (concluding that, even
without the opportunity to opt out, the other "due process protections as articulated in
Shutts are sufficient to bind absent class members who had sufficient minimum contacts
with the forum."); In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 960 F.2d 285, 292 (2d Cir.
1992) (finding that, since plaintiffs had already submitted to the court's in personam
jurisdiction, Shutts vras "inapposite").
88. In an interesting variation on this issue, Professor Woolley argues that there may
be no substantive right to opt out of damage claims, but "as a general matter a class
member must be allowed to intervene as a full party in a proceeding that will extinguish
her claim," by "presenting evidence and making legal arguments not otherwise before the
court." Woolley, supra note 1, 573. He is sharply critical of Aheam I, where the divided
panel believed that adequate representation alone was sufficient to preclude the rights of
absent members. See id. at 581 n.42.
89. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 810. To be sure, the Court cannot be said to have resolved the
issue of antisuit injunctions, but the quoted language certainly supplies room to doubt
their validity.
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state and any individual over whom its courts seek to assert jurisdiction
.... In Shutts, the Court did not remove this protection from class plain-
tiffs. Its reasoning, instead, was based upon the inference of consent
from class members' failure to opt out."90 Shutts sanctions a preclusion
doctrine that is both limited and conditional. Under Shutts, due process
challenges cannot be barred in F2 simply because the absent nonresident
class member falls to opt out.
The implied consent rationale which runs through the Court's opin-
ion 9 ' has an obvious appeal when it is confined to situations where the
absent plaintiffs lack independently viable claims and stand only to "win"
by the lawsuit, as was the case in Shutts.92 But the rationale has an equally
90. Miller & Crumpp, supra note 24, at 16. This is a standard reading of Shutts. See,
e.g., Redish & Beste, supra note 61, at 956.
91. The Court initially framed petitioner's argument in consent terms:
Reduced to its essentials, petitioner's argument is that unless out-of-state plaintiffs
affirmatively consent, the Kansas courts may not exert jurisdiction over their
claims. Petitioner claims that failure to execute and return the 'request for
exclusion' provided with the class notice cannot constitute consent of the out-of-
state plaintiffs; thus Kansas courts may exercise jurisdiction over these plaintiffs
only if the plaintiffs possess the sufficient "minimum contacts" with Kansas as that
term is used in cases involving personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants.
Since Kansas had no prelitigation contact with many of the plaintiffs and leases
involved, petitioner claims that Kansas has exceeded its jurisdictional reach and
thereby violated the due process rights of the absent plaintiffs.
Shutts, 472 U.S. at 806 (citations omitted). After observing that states "place fewer burdens
upon absent class plaintiffs than they do upon absent defendants," id. at 811, and
prescribing the constitutionally required minimum safeguards for multi-state court
damage actions, see id. at 811-12, the Court then returned to the consent theme, rejecting
the argument that an opt-in was required: "Any plaintiff may consent to jurisdiction ....
The essential question, then, is how stringent the requirement for a showing of consent
will be." Id. at 812. Noting the number of class members who had either opted out or
been excluded, the Court continued:
We think that such results show that the "opt out" procedure provided by Kansas
is by no means pro forma, and that the Constitution does not require more to
protect what must be the somewhat rare species of class member who is unwilling
to execute an "opt out" form, but whose claim is nonetheless so important that he
cannot be presumed to consent to being a member of the class by his failure to
do so.
Id. at 813.
92. The Court assumed that, as rational actors, absent class members would either
consent to the suit of their "representatives" or opt out. That assumption was, in turn,
clearly grounded in a belief that the non-opt-out class members were small investors who
lacked independently viable claims. The class finally certified consisted of over 28,000
royalty owners, and the average claim of each royalty owner for interest on the suspended
royalties was only $100. See id. at 801. Under these circumstances-where individuals
have negative-value claims-the Court saw no plausible danger of distant forum abuse.
Nonresident class members stood only to "win." In these circumstances, invocation of the
consent rationale is akin to its use in tort law. A doctor who operates on an unconscious
person injured by an accident is not charged with battery. The law assumes that such a
person, if fully informed, would consent to the otherwise unprivileged touching. (To be
sure, a few class members might have preferred not to sue for altruistic or other
noneconomic reasons, but that seems a consideration not entitled to much weight. They
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obvious bootstrapping quality: "Absence of power to compel appearance
is logically inconsistent with power to compel a binding choice through
the compulsory filing of a paper with the court."93 In stretching to dis-
cover "consent," however, Shutts drew upon the Court's longstanding ju-
risprudential practice: results are initially explained in terms of an "im-
plied" consent, and the fictional nature of that explanation is
subsequently admitted.94 In fact, of course, Shutts announced a rule of
forfeiture (i.e., "you are precluded if you do not take affirmative step
X.").95 The findamental issue is, therefore, the scope of the jurisdic-
tional forfeiture allowed by Shutts's "implied consent" fiction. That is the
basic issue that must be dealt with regardless of whether Shutts is under-
stood as a decision about fictional "implied consent" to personal jurisdic-
tion or one ultimately grounded in more general notions of "'fair play
and substantial justice."' 96
could, however, refuse to accept their "winnings.") But-and it is a large but-the Court's
reasoning was not. limited to negative-value claims, and thus, Shutts "also may affect the
rights of a large plaintiff." Miller & Crumpp, supra note 24, at 18.
93. Miller & Crumpp, supra note 24, at 17.
94. See, e.g., Olberding v. Illinois Cent. RR. Co., 346 U.S. 338, 340-41 (1953) ("It is
true that in order to ease the process by which new decisions are fitted into pre-existing
modes of analysis there has been some fictive talk to the effect that the reason why a non-
resident can be subjected to a state's jurisdiction is that the non-resident has 'impliedly
consented.'"); see also Stein, supra note 61, at 694-97 (discussing the schism between
theories of personal jurisdiction and requirements of the Due Process Clause).
95. See Diane P. Wood, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction and Class Actions, 62 Ind. L.J. 597,
620 (1987) ("The Shutts consent finesse, whereby consent can be inferred from a failure to
opt out, does violence to the general theory of consent."). Even ordinary contract law does
not ascribe a binding effect to an offeree's failure to respond to an offer. More
importantly, in dealing with constitutional guarantees, consent or waiver (the voluntary
relinquishment of a known right) is not usually ascribed to inaction. This should be
especially clear where the "consent"-inducing notices are written obscurely and are designed
by counsel to encourage inaction. Shutts's forfeiture doctrine may be plausible if the sole
interest believed to be involved is individual fairness, and only if the absent class members
stand only to gain from the lawsuit. When those conditions are relaxed, however (for
example, when the claims involved are not negative-value claims), the outcome becomes
less clear. And if previously forgotten federalism concerns are factored in, Shutts becomes
most problematic. Fully assuming that multi-state and nationwide state-court class actions
are a good thing in the abstract, what precisely was Kansas's interest in reaching beyond its
borders and adjudicating the overwhelming portion of the interests of the Shutts claimants,
the vast majority of whom were nonresidents who neither owned land in Kansas nor
affirmatively consented to such an adjudication? In sanctioning class actions in forums
with littie or no connection to the prelitigation events, and with no effective coordinating
mechanisms in place, the Court overlooked the potential for abuse inherent in such
proceedings due to races to judgment and reverse auctions.
96. International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). Several decisions read Shutts as concerned with
fundamental fairness only. See, e.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 78 F.3d 764,
777-78 (2d Cir. 1996) (distinguishing Shutts on the ground that the class action before it
involved restructuring a trust, an equitable action); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig.
(Agent Orange H), 996 F.2d 1425, 1435 (2d Cir. 1993) (treating Shutts as a case about
fundamental fairness); Grimes v. Vitalink Comm. Corp., 17 F.3d at 1553, 1558-61 (3d Cir.
1994) (same). For efforts at formulating a multi-factored test for the assertion of
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Much in the Court's opinion supports an interpretation of Shutts
that is mainly about fundamental fairness, not "implied consent."9 7 And
a fundamental fairness standard might not invariably require either preli-
tigation contact or consent in order to establish in personam jurisdiction
over nonresident class members. 98 Explaining Shutts in terms of implied
jurisdiction over absent class members, and thereby allowing certification of non-opt-out
damage actions, see Miller & Crumpp, supra note 24, at 55-57. Their proposal, mixing as
it does such factors as efficiency and fairness, suffers from considerable indefiniteness.
97. The Court's emphasis on wide differences between absent class members and
defendants resonates with such a conception:
Because States place fewer burdens upon absent class plaintiffs than they do upon
absent defendants in nonclass suits, the Due Process Clause need not and does
not afford the former as much protection from state-court jurisdiction as it does
the latter .... In this case we hold that a forum State may exercise jurisdiction over the
claim of an absent class-action plaintiff, even though that plaintiff may not possess the
minimum contacts with the forum which would support personal jurisdiction over a
defendant.
Shutts, 472 U.S. at 811 (emphasis added).
So too does the Court's belief that the damage claims of the non-opt-out class
members were not individually viable. See id. at 812-13. As noted, the median class claim
was $100.00. See id. at 801. For any constitutional standard grounded in concepts of
reasonableness, an arguable difference exists, as Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S.
Ct. 2231, 2246 (1997) indicated, between negative value class action claims and class
actions in which the individual class members' claims are independently viable, as in the
asbestos cases. See Robert G. Bone, Rule 23 Redux: Empowering the Federal Class Action,
14 Rev. Litig. 79, 103 nn.72-73 (1994) (outlining arguments for more lenience in
certification of "small-claimant class actions"). But see Perino, supra note 71, at 95
(granting opt-out rights in mass tort cases involving individually viable claims prevents
global resolution of claims). Moreover, the facts of Shutts did not present an occasion to
trigger any judicial concern over distant forum abuse. As noted, class certification
occurred only after notice of the proceedings and of the absent members' rights to be
heard and to opt out had been given by first class mail. Unlike many class action notices,
the notice actually seemed calculated to inform. Over three thousand opt-outs occurred
and an additional fifteen hundred class members were excluded because of inadequate
proof that they had received notice. See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 801; Solomon, supra note 85, at
1633-34. Miller and Crumpp cast considerable doubt on this apparently worry-free
proceeding. They argue that Kansas was a "magnet forum" because of its especially
favorable substantive law for plaintiffs. See Miller & Crumpp, supra note 24, at 57-67.
Efforts to obtain application of Kansas substantive law (though limited by the Supreme
Court) had been the very purpose of the litigation. They also argue that the Supreme
Court, in fact, left open the possibility that Kansas could apply its own law to many
unaffiliated transactions. See id. at 60. But if Kansas had been chosen because of its
favorable substantive law, that fact could only inure to the benefit of absent class members.
Finally, the Court's concern that the consequences of a contrary holding "would require
the invalidation of scores of state statutes and of the class-action provision of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure," and would "sacrifice the obvious advantages in judicial efficiency
resulting from the 'opt out' approach," is expressive of concerns about fairness. See Shutts,
472 U.S. at 813-14.
98. Framed in terms of fundamental fairness, the underlying issue in Shutts was under
what circumstances (assuming adequate representation "at all times") F1 might have an
interest sufficient to allow it to preclude fairly (by adjudication or settlement) the
underlying substantive rights of nonresident class members who lacked minimum contacts
with the forum or meaningful consent. See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 808. The Court also noted
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consent or fundamental fairness still leaves open the content of these
terms, if the issue is the scope of Fl's in personam jurisdiction over non-
resident class members. And here, commentators and courts have ig-
nored the role played by the Court's emphasis on "minimum procedural
safeguard[s]" 99 in the jurisdictional analysis of Shutts. While the sharp
distinction between issues of in personam jurisdiction and procedural
due process has been criticized, 10 0 it is a distinction deeply embedded in
our jurisprudence. To the extent that the "minimum procedural safe-
guard [s]" take on a dimension beyond that of simple procedural due pro-
cess and are also viewed as conditions necessary for F1 to have sufficient
in personam jurisdiction to preclude the underlying substantive claims of
nonresident class members, Shutts magnifies the importance of this dis-
tinction. 0 1 For many courts and commentators, however, in personam
jurisdiction in Shutts turns entirely on only one of these safeguards: the
right to opt out.. A class member's failure to opt out establishes in per-
sonam jurisdiction. This premise has had two consequences: first, it has
obscured the vital role played by adequate representation in the Court's
jurisdictional analysis; second, it has engendered considerable confusion
over the nature of the opt-out right. In the process, issues of jurisdiction
and those of substantive due process have become blurred.
Hansberry v. Lee and other decisions make clear that, to bind absent
class members on the basis of representation, there must, at a minimum,
have been adequate representation. 10 2 This is a matter of procedural
that, as it had "pointed out in Hansberny, the class action was an invention of equity to
enable it to proceed to a decree in suits where the number of those interested in the
litigation was too great to permitjoinder." Id. at 808. This is an old recognition. See, e.g.,
Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 366 (1921) ("[C] lass suits were known
before the adoption of ourjudicial system, and were in use in English chancery"). Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(b) (3), however, maintains some element of consent because individual members
can opt out. To be sure, state legislative interests have not provided a basis for in
personam jurisdiction even with respect to defendants. See Silberman, supra note 61, at
758 ("[s]tate legislative interests do not appear to count for much in the constitutional
jurisprudence" of jurisdiction). But see, e.g., Harold L. Korn, Rethinking Personal
Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate Mass Torts, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 2183, 2208-09
(1997) (arguing that legislative jurisdiction should provide a basis forjudicial jurisdiction).
Contemporary standards of reasonableness, however, might permit considerations of such
interests with respect to some claims of nonresident class plaintiffs. Preclusion might
occur with respect to the substantive claims of nonresident class members who failed to
take an affirmative step, such as opting out in favor of individual damage claims, or who
failed to respond to a notice of the right to intervene and intent to preclude.
99. Namely, notice, the right to opt out, the right to participate, and the right to
adequate representation at all times.
100. See, e.g., Korn, supra note 98, at 2208-09; Redish & Beste, supra note 61, at
947-48.
101. Whether described as minimum procedural safeguards or in personam
jurisdictional prerequisites, however, interesting problems abound. The Court, for
example, nowhere explains the necessity for the existence of both a right to opt out and a
right to participate; nor does the Court explain why it characterizes a right to opt out as a
"procedural" rather than a "substantive" right.
102. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
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due process applicable to all absent class members, whether in-state or
out-of-state.1 03 Existing doctrine holds that challenges to adequacy can
be made in F2.10 4 Why, then, does the Court mention adequate repre-
sentation in Shutts when the only issue before the court is in personam
jurisdiction? It could simply be by way of caution and might not consti-
tute a part of the Court's in personamrjurisdictional analysis. Whether it
is part of the jurisdictional mechanism is, however, an issue of considera-
ble importance. We can assume arguendo that in some circumstances F1
could restructure its existing practices and confine due process chal-
lenges to itself. For example, due process challenges by in-state class
members and out-of-state class members with sufficient contacts with the
forum could be confined to the F1 court.10 5 To the extent, however, that
adequate representation "at all times" also has an in personam jurisdic-
tional dimension, Fl's authority to so restructure challenges is far more
limited. Fl's in personam jurisdiction-the power to bind-is not per-
manently established by a class member's failure to opt out. That juris-
diction is conditioned upon adequate representation "at all times," such
that jurisdiction is lost when representation is inadequate.
Put differently, Shutts allows F1 only a conditional and limited in per-
sonam jurisdiction over nonresident class members. Under Shutts, failure
to opt out is only one part of what is necessary for the exercise ofjurisdic-
tion sufficient to bind, whether Shutts is viewed in terms of "implied con-
sent" to jurisdiction or fundamental fairness. It is not finally established
until the F1 proceedings have been concluded in accordance with due
process. And, following standard preclusion law, the lack of in personam
jurisdiction can be collaterally attacked by nonappearing class members.
In the current world of multiple class actions, it seems to me eminently
desirable to understand the Court's insistence upon adequacy of repre-
sentation in jurisdictional terms. So understood, the requirement
reduces the dangers of class action abuse ("fundamental fairness") and
respects the territorial limits on state court jurisdiction.
As noted, courts and commentators alike have focused on Shutts's
requirement of a right to opt out of damage claims as a sufficient condi-
tion for the exercise of in personam jurisdiction. They have incorrectly
assumed that a failure to opt out is a consent to jurisdiction for all pur-
poses. 10 6 Not surprisingly, when "in personam" jurisdiction has been
otherwise established, the lower federal courts have refused to read Shutts
103. See Epstein v. MCA, Inc. (Epstein I), 126 F.3d 1235, 1242 (9th Cir. 1997) ("There
is nothing in Shutts, however-or in any other case-to suggest that Shutts offers protection
only to those absentees who are beyond the in personam reach of the forum.").
104. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
105. See infra Conclusion. Of course, adequate notice must exist if the F1 proceeding
is expected to foreclose an absent member's rights with respect to due process issues. See
Richards v.Jefferson County, 116 S. Ct. 1761, 1768 (1996). However, unless state law does
alter its practice (as the ALI proposal, for example, contemplates), absent class members
cannot now be bound in the same manner in which parties to the litigation are bound.
106. See, e.g., infra Part III.
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as requiring an opt-out.10 7 Much confusion remains, however, because
opt-out issues arise at several distinct levels, and they have become inter-
twined. One question is whether Rule 23 authorizes certification of sub-
stantial damage claims under (b) (1) (B) and (b) (2), both of which nor-
mally do not envisage an opt-out right, and whether the Anti-Injunction
Act bars such certification. x08 More generally, another question is
whether an opt-out right is required as a matter of substantive due pro-
cess for some or all damage claims.10 9 While this Article is not an appro-
priate forum in which to explore these topics at length, clarity demands
that the separate nature of these issues be kept in mind. Debate contin-
ues over whether Shutts and Amchem Products should be understood as
presuming that all absent class members have a substantive due process
right to opt out of some or all damage claims."10 If so, that result is not
tied to conceptions of preclusion or in personam jurisdiction; in-state
class members would possess such a right even though clearly subject to
the court's territorial jurisdiction.
Recognition of a substantive due process right to opt out of at least
some damage claims has considerable plausibility. It would limit the
threat posed by modem aggregation practice to our long-standing tradi-
tion of individual litigation autonomy."' That tradition's appeal is at its
107. See cases cited in supra note 87.
108. In In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1180-81 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 988 (1982), for example, a divided court of appeals involving parallel state and
federal proceedings refused to certify a Rule 23(b) (1) (B) non-opt-out claim for damages
on the ground that is was the equivalent of an injunction forbidden by the Anti-Injunction
Act. While the district court's order did not formally enjoin the state court proceeding,
the court of appeals concluded that the certification was equivalent to an injunction for
purposes of its appellatejurisdiction. See id. at 1179-80. The court then assumed that the
district court's order was also an "injunction" for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act. See
id. at 1181-84. While most appellate courts have been reluctant to permit certification of
non-opt-out damage classes under (b) (1) (B), Judge Weinstein has not been so hesitant.
In In re joint Asbestos E. & S. Dist. Litig., 134 F.R.D. 32 (1990), he certified such a class
assuming that his order was a nationwide injunction, and in the process rejected Federal
Skywalk Cases: "The dicta in the Skywalk decision and its subsequent interpretation by other
courts have generated considerable criticism." Id. at 39. For additional discussion, see
Mullenix, supra note 57, at 896-908.
109. Clearly... the purpose and the utility of (b) (1) (B) limited fund would be
fatally subverted by requiring or providing an opt out right to class members. On
the other hand, there is great force to the argument that binding absentee or
future class members to a limited fund settlement, where the plaintiff lacks
sufficient minimum contacts with the forum, denies those claimants due process.
Mullenix, supra note 57, at 914-15.
110. See, e.g., Nottingham Partners v. Dana, 564 A.2d 1089, 1097-1101 (Del. 1989)
(holding that Shutis does not require an opt-out of monetary claims in an action that is
predominantly for equitable relief). Since the objector asserting such a right was actually
before the Delaware court, the court's discussion must be taken to reflect a substantive, not
ajurisdictional, holding. But the court itself seemed unaware of that distinction.
111. The Court has referred to "[o]ur deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone
should have his own day in court," Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989) (quoting A.
Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 4449 (1981)), and Phillips Petroleum
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strongest when individual plaintiffs seek compensatory damages for per-
sonal injuries, 1 2 and they resist "conscription" by a class "representative"
(or, more realistically, his attorney)."13 "The right to individual control
and management of one's own personal injury claim is itself a substantive
right, indeed perhaps a constitutional right." 1 4 In any event, "[t]here is
no reason to believe that a serious personal injury claimant desires to be
represented by class counsel." 1 5 As of yet, however, opt-out issues re-
main unresolved by the Supreme Court. 16
C. The Need for Clarification
Brown v. Ticor Title Insurance Co.,117 a sequel to Real Estate Title,"18
illustrated the existing uncertainty in class action doctrine that has re-
sulted from intertwining such notions as implied consent, the right to opt
out, and preclusion. In the Real Estate Title litigation, a multi-district
panel in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania approved a settlement be-
tween a class of insurance consumers alleging federal antisuit violation
and the defendant title insurance companies. 119 However, on the basis of
Co. v. Shutts itself noted that a plaintiffs claim may be "sufficiently large or important that
he wishes to litigate it on his own," 472 U.S. 797, 813 (1985), a concern again recognized in
Amchem Products, Inc. v. VXmdsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2246-47 (1997). Patrick Woolley
reads Shutts as mandating not an opt-out for individual damage claims but rather a right to
intervene and participate. See Woolley, supra note 1, at 572. This may prove to be correct
in the end, but it is not a fair reading of Shutts. Shutts was about the conditions sufficient
for preclusion of nonresident class members, not whether all class members, in-state or
out-of-state, had opt-out rights.
112. See Roger H. Trangsrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U. Ill.
L. Rev. 69, 74 ("Underlying our traditional notion of individual claim autonomy in substantial
tort cases is the natural law notion that this is an important personal right of the individual
.... It [is] not the duty of the government or of some third party to initiate the suit, or of
some third party to interfere . . ").
113. See Coffee, Testimony, supra note 31, at 6-8. The views of various writers are
collected supra in note 73, and further references can be found in the works collected by
Professor Shapiro. See supra note 47. Professor Shapiro himself is sympathetic to the use
of class actions in the mass tort context. See Shapiro, supra note 47, at 927.
114. Carrington & Apanovitch, supra note 48, at 472. They add, however, that
"[p]erhaps we cannot afford the luxury of treating citizens as individuals in mass torts
cases, but surely a law abrogating the right of individuals to be treated as individuals in
regard to their distinctive claims is a substantive enactment [to be made by Congress]." Id.
115. Id. at 462.
116. In Adams v. Robertson, the issue presented was whether a state court class action
that had awarded only equitable relief, but "which petitioners characterize[d] primarily as
involving claims for monetary relief" (thereby tracking the language of the Shutts
footnote), must accord a right to opt out for damage claims. 117 S. Ct. 1028, 1029 (1997).
The Court dismissed the writ because that issue had not been raised in the state court.
Earlier, the Court had avoided a similar question in Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S.
117, 121 (1994) (majority suggesting that a Rule 23(b) (2) certification might not properly
include substantial damage claims).
117. 982 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1992).
118. For a discussion of Real Estate Title, see infra text accompanying notes 138-153.
119. See In re Real Estate Title & Settlement Servs. Antitrust Litig. (Real Estate Title),
869 F.2d 760, 762 (3d Cir. 1989).
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the price fixing alleged in Real Estate Title, a subgroup of class representa-
tives sought damages and injunctive relief in a federal district court in
Arizona, but that court sustained the title insurance companies' preclu-
sion defense. 120 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed. The court ad-
dressed the merits of two due process objections to the F1 proceeding:
inadequate representation and the lack of a right to opt out of "substan-
tial" monetary claims. The first claim was rejected on the merits; 12 1 but
the second claim was sustained in three terse paragraphs. 122 The court
referred to the appellant's "minimal procedural due process claim," cit-
ing Shutts, and without elaboration concluded:
Because Brown had no opportunity to opt out of the MDL 633
litigation, we hold there would be a violation of minimal due
process if Brown's damage claims were held barred by res judi-
cata. Brown will be bound by the injunctive relief provided by
the settlement in MDL 633, and foreclosed from seeking other
or further injunctive relief in this case, but resjudicata will not
bar Brown's claims for monetary damages against Ticor.123
These sentences are, at best, obscure because the reference to "res judi-
cata" can be read in Shutts's terms, i.e., no preclusion because of insuffi-
cient contacts with the MDL forum (and no consent). Read in this way,
the opinion fails to explain why the injunctive part of the MDLjudgment
was binding since even assuming adequate representation, no in per-
sonama jurisdiction existed.12 4 It is more likely that the court understood
(misunderstood?) Shutts as conferring an independent substantive due
process right to opt out of damage claims.
The Supreme Court opinion was inconclusive. 12 5 The Court de-
scribed the proceedings below as follows:
The Ninth Circuit reversed, accepting respondents' contention
that it would violate due process to accord resjudicata effect to a
judgment in a class action that involved money damages claims
(or perhaps that involved primarily money damages claims)
against a plaintiff in the previous suit who had not been af-
forded a right to opt out on those claims.' 26
120. See Brown v. Ticor, 982 F.2d at 389 (discussing district court holding).
121. See id. at 390-91.
122. See id. at 392.
123. Id.
124. Professor Woolley states that "[flew commentators argue that the due process
minima set forth in Shutts apply to Rule 23(b) (2) class suits seeking only equitable relief."
Woolley, supra note 1, at 579 n.36. He criticizes the contrary view of Professor Weber, who
"has it backwards, perhaps in part because he fails to give sufficient weight to the fact that,
at bottom, Shutts was a personal jurisdiction case." Id. This otherwise puzzling statement
rests on Professor Woolley's belief that the due process requirements for in personam
jurisdiction are satisfied as long as the absent class members are given "an opportunity to
be heard and participate in the litigations." Id.
125. See Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117 (1994).
126. Id. at 120.
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Although it uses the term "resjudicata," the Court's formulation suggests
that it believed that the issue being pressed was a claim of a substantive
opt-out right rather than the jurisdictional conditions necessary for pre-
clusion to occur.127 In any event, however, the Court declined to address
either issue, stating that standard preclusion law foreclosed any collateral
challenge in the Ninth Circuit to the propriety of the MDL court's initial
(b) (1) (A) and (b) (2) class certification. 128 That being so:
[the] certified question is of no general consequence if,
whether or not absent class members have a constitutional right
to opt out of such actions, they have a right to do so under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Such a right would exist if, in
actions seeking monetary damages, classes can be certified only
under Rule 23(b) (3), which permits opt-out, and not under
Rules 23(b) (1) and (b) (2), which do not. That is at least a sub-
stantial possibility-and we would normally resolve that prelimi-
nary nonconstitutional question before proceeding to the con-
stitutional claim.
129
Justice O'Connor, joined by the Chief Justice (Shutts's author) and
Justice Kennedy, would have reached the question. Justice O'Connor's
opinion radiates a belief that, whatever Shutts means, it is limited to class
claims that are "predominantly" for monetary relief and in which the eq-
uitable or declaratory relief sought is trivial or nonexistent.8 0 The opin-
ion, however, does not distinguish between Shutts viewed as a case of in
personam jurisdiction and Shutts viewed as a case recognizing a substan-
tive due process opt-out right for individual monetary claims. Nor does it
display an awareness of how far requests for certification of damage
claims under provisions other than (b) (3) may be at variance with the
understanding of the drafters of Rule 23. If this is so, then any opt-out
127. Id. at 120, 121.
128. See id. at 121. The Court held that whether certification in the MDL proceeding
was proper under (b) (1) or (b) (2) was a determination that could be challenged only on
direct appeal.
129. Id.
130. See id. at 124-25 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). As Justice O'Connor explained:
The Court's assertion that "our resolution of the posited constitutional question
may be... of virtually no practical consequence in fact," is unsound. The lower
courts have consistently held that the presence of monetary damages claims does
not preclude class certification under Rules 23(b) (1) (A) and (b) (2). Whether or
not those decisions are correct (a question we need not, and indeed should not,
decide today), they at least indicate that there are a substantial number of class
members in exactly the same position as respondents. Under the Ninth Circuit's
rationale in this case, every one of them has the right to go into federal court and
relitigate their claims against the defendants in the original action. The
individuals, corporations, and governments that have successfully defended
against class actions or reached appropriate settlements, but are now subject to
relitigation of the same claims with individual class members, will rightly dispute
the Court's characterization of the constitutional rule in this case as
inconsequential.
Id. at 124 (citations omitted) (quoting majority opinion).
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"right" may be a function of the construction of Rule 23, rather than a
requirement of due process raised by Shutts's jurisdictional limitations.
Amchem Products, an opinion in which Justice O'Connor joined, may
be the first step towards recovering this lost understanding of the original
purposes of Rule 23. l31 While Justice Ginsburg acknowledged that Rule
23(b) (3) "does not exclude from certification cases in which individual
damage claims run high," she noted that the drafters of the rule "had
dominantly in mind vindication of 'the rights of people who individually
would be without effective strength to bring their opponents into court at
all.'"132 Nevertheless, to the extent that the Supreme Court's construc-
tion of Rule 23 limits non-(b) (3) certification of damage claims, the re-
sult will simply intensify the importance of the in personam jurisdiction
sustained in Shutts. While most states have class action rules patterned on
Rule 23, state courts are not bound by the Supreme Court's construction
of the federal rule.13 3 Ultimately, therefore, the Court must address the
due process limitations on nationwide state court class actions.
18 4
131. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 2231 (1997). Even before Amchem Products,
considerable skepticism existed over holdings that permitted monetary relief in a (b) (2)
class, at least where monetary relief did not predominate. In Eubanks v. Billington, 110
F.3d 87 (D.C. Cir. 1997), the district court certified a (b) (2) class, awarding equitable relief
and $8.5 million in monetary relief. It denied the opt-out motions of two class members.
On appeal, the appellants had made no challenge to the propriety of the (b) (2)
certification; they had challenged only the denial of the right to opt out. In that posture,
the court said:
Although the defining characteristic of the (b) (2) class is that it seeks declaratory
or injunctive relief applicable to the class as a whole, it is not uncommon in
employment discrimination cases for the class also to seek monetary relief in the
form of back pay or front pay. Courts have generally permitted (b) (2) classes to
recover monerary relief in addition to declaratory or injunctive relief, at least where
the monetary reief does not predominate.
Id. at 92 (emphasis added). The court noted that many commentators have urged that
classes should be certified under (b) (2) rather than (b) (3) whenever possible so as to
avoid (b) (3)'s "often burdensome" notice requirements. Id. at 92-93. The court,
however, was skeptical. Although the issue was not before it, the court was clearly troubled
by certification of substantial money damages claims under (b) (2), doubting that the
drafters of Rule 23 had contemplated such claims. See id. at 93. Eubanks's sensitivity to the
dangers of certifying disparate monetary claims under (b) (2), id. at 94, anticipated Amchem
Products' concern over "the class cohesion that legitimizes representative action in the first
place," Amchem Prods., 117 S. Ct. at 2236. But a more recent decision by the court of
appeals, Thomas v. Albright, 139 F.3d 227 (D.C. Cir. 1998), displayed no comparable
concern over the assertion of monetary claims in (b) (2) actions.
132. Id. at 2246 (quoting Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. Indus. & Com.
L. Rev. 497, 497 (1969)).
133. Nonetheless, state courts have indicated a strong propensity to follow federal
courts' interpretations of Rule 23. See, e.g., Ford v. Murphy Oil U.SA., Inc., 703 S.2d 542,
549-51 (La. 1997) (discussing Supreme Court's interpretation of Rule 23); General Motors
Corp. v Bloyed, 916 S.W.2d 949, 954 & n.1 (Tex. 1996).
134. For an argument encouraging such suits in state courts, see Mark C. Weber,
Complex Litigation and the State Courts: Constitutional and Practical Advantages of the
State Forum over the Federal Forum in Mass Tort Cases, 21 Hastings Const. L.Q. 215
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The principle that a court may lawfully enjoin litigants and those par-
ties who have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum has been ap-
plied in the class action context. In Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble,135
the Supreme Court upheld an antisuit injunction secured by an Indiana
fraternal life insurance association against its Indiana certificate holders.
The life insurance association had sought the injunction on the basis of a
prior favorable class action judgment in a suit brought against it by out-of-
state certificate holders. There was, of course, no question of in per-
sonamjurisdiction over the Indiana defendants. In a single sentence, the
.Supreme Court stated that the resident Indiana class members "were pre-
cluded by the decree of the District Court, [and] an ancillary bill may be
prosecuted from the same court to protect the rights secured to all in the
class by the decree rendered." 3 6 But what of injunctions or preclusion
against nonparty, nonresident class members lacking minimum contacts,
an issue left open after Shutts? As already discussed, Shutts permits the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over such parties for the purpose of pre-
cluding underlying substantive claims. But its reasoning, focusing as it
does on due process concerns, does not extend to enjoining or preclud-
ing collateral due process challenges brought in F2. Nevertheless, three
Third Circuit decisions, each unique in certain respects, have looked to
Shutts's opt-out rationale to resolve this latter issue. In so doing, they
have distorted Shutts by putting excessive weight on its "implied consent"
fiction, while giving insufficient consideration to its due process con-
cerns, including the requirement that there be adequate representation
at all times. Though in two of the three instances discussed below, an
injunction did not issue, the rule that has emerged from these three cases
is that the existence of a right to opt out is not only a necessary but a
sufficient condition for in personam jurisdiction. Each court completely
ignores the fact that, under Shutts, adequate representation at all times
was also an indispensable requirement, and F1 could not foreclose a chal-
lenge to its jurisdiction in F2. The cases also highlight the limits inherent
in ordering the class action landscape-so fraught with opportunities for
abuse-with existing judicial doctrine. In the third of the three Third
Circuit cases, GM Trucks 1, where an injunction to prevent the migratory
settler problem would have been desirable from a policy standpoint, the
(1994). See also Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Life After Amchem: The Class Struggle Continues,
31 Loyola L. Rev. 373, 386-94 (1998).
135. 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
136. Id. at 367 (citations omitted). The Court assumed that the ancillary injunction
bound both the representative parties and the absent Indiana class members. Similar
principles have been applied in the preclusion context. See, e.g., Sovereign Camp of the
Woodmen of the World v. Bolin, 305 U.S. 66, 78-79 (1938) (full faith and credit must be
accorded to earlier class action judgment). See also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v.
Epstein (Epstein II), 116 S. Ct. 873, 878 (1996) ("[A] judgment entered in a class action,
like any otherjudgment entered in a state judicial proceeding, is presumptively entitled to
full faith and credit under the express terms of [28 U.S.C. § 1738).").
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court could not issue one because it did not have the requisite jurisdic-
tional powers to do so.
13 7
A. Three Third Circuit Decisions
As noted above, Real Estate Title'38 was a Pennsylvania MDL proceed-
ing in which the various class complaints, transferred to the MDL court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, alleged violations of the federal antitrust
laws and sought both damages for past wrongs and injunctive relief
against future violations. A proposed settlement provided for injunctive
relief only, and it purported to release state as well as federal claims.13 9
Over strenuous objections as to adequacy of representation, the MDL
court approved the settlement and certified a non-opt-out (b) (1) (A)
and (b) (2) classes.140 That judgment was summarily affirmed by the
Third Circuit without opinion.' 41 Two Arizona school boards, mean-
while, brought suit in a state court alleging state law causes of action. 142
The school boards had appeared (through the Arizona Attorney
General) before the MDL court only to insist that they had a right to opt
out.143 The MDL court entered an antisuit injunction and the school
boards appealed that order.""'
Like Shutts, the appeal was not about a substantive due process right
to opt out of individual damage claims. The focus was only on the limits
of the MDL court's in personam jurisdiction: the school boards did not
"assert any personal jurisdiction obstacle to binding them to the settle-
ment.' 45 The school boards insisted, however, that "no matter what the
preclusive effect [of the district court's judgment, that court] had no
power to issue an injunction against them because it possessed no per-
sonaljurisdiction over them";' 46 the court was "without power to enter an
injunction against absentee class members who have neither consented to
137. See infra text accompanying notes 260-61, discussing proposed solution of
migratory settler problem, and, in general, calling for comprehensive legislative action.
138. In re Real Estate Title & Settlement Servs. Antitrust Litig. (Real Estate Title), 869
F.2d 760 (3d Cir. 1989).
139. The MDL proceeding involved a dozen class action complaints filed as tag-alongs
to a prior federal proceeding. The damage claims were abandoned on the basis of a
Supreme Court decision that weakened the legal theories asserted in the complaints. See
Mullenix, supra note 57, at 877-78.
140. See Real Estate Title, 869 F.2d at 763. Shutts's "implied consent" rationale could,
therefore, play no role in the litigation.
141. See id at 764.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 770 ("In its prior appearances, Arizona did not litigate the merits of the
settlement agreement, nor did it litigate its adequacy of representation claim; in the
district court [and on its appeal] it only moved to opt out."). They also challenged the
adequacy of notice, which the court understood to be connected to a right to opt out. See
id. at 770-71.
144. See id. at 762.
145. Id. at 765-
146. Id. at 760.
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jurisdiction nor have established minimum contacts with the forum." 1 4 7
Why the appellants did not challenge the entire F1 judgment for lack of
in personam jurisdiction is not clear. The appellants apparently assumed
that a failure to opt out was the equivalent of consent under Shutts.
In his opinion for the court, Judge Becker began with a description
of Shutts as a case about fundamental fairness; accordingly, for him "[t] he
procedural protections of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 replace the rigid rules of
personal jurisdiction." 148 But he quickly retreated to the precise Shutts
framework of implied consent, and concluded that:
[I]f the member has not been given the opportunity to opt out
in a class action involving both important injunctive relief and
damage claims, the member must either have minimum con-
tacts with the forum or consent to jurisdiction in order to be
enjoined by the district court that entertained the class
action.149
Note the role that opt-out plays in that jurisdictional analysis. Judge
Becker emphasized that no act of Congress purported to channel all liti-
gation to the MDL court.150 At least absent such channeling legislation,
Judge Becker said, the fundamental issue was whether due process re-
quires that nonresident class members have minimum contacts with the
MDL court in order to support entry of an antisuit injunction.' 5 ' Answer-
ing that question in the affirmative, Judge Becker rejected the argument
that this threatened the efficacy of the class action mechanism and em-
phasized the checking value of collateral attack.152 In the process, he
noted that subjecting nonresident class members to an antisuit injunction
would cost them more than the cost incurred by the Shutts plaintiffs:
147. Id.
148. Id. at 766. "[Iun this context [they] are all that is needed to meet the
requirements of due process." Id.
149. Id. at 769 (footnote omitted).
150. See id. at 767-68. Judge Becker made no mention of the significance, if any, of
the fact that nationwide in personam jurisdiction over defendants exists under the antitrust
act.
151. See id. at 769 ("The only issue we address is whether an absent class member can
be enjoined from relitigation if the member does not have minimum contacts with the
forum.").
152. See id. He went on to note:
We do not agree with appellees' dire predictions. Ever since Hansbeny v. Lee was
decided in 1940, collateral attacks have been considered to be a necessary part of
the class action scheme. Rather than threatening the vitality of the class action
mechanism, the fact that some plaintiffs will be able to extricate themselves from
class action judgments if subsequent courts find them to be inadequately
represented is integral to the constitutionality of the class action procedure.
Id. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 45 (1940) (stating that it would violate due process
to bind an inadequately represented absent party to a prior judgment). Finally, on
grounds of "fairness and efficiency," Judge Becker also rejected the claim that, simply by
appearing to assert a right to opt out, the objectors had "consented" to the jurisdiction of
the F1 court. See Real Estate Title, 869 F.2d at 770-71.
1998] 1181
COLUMBIA LAW REV1EW
[A]s the Court in Shutts pointed out, the absent class members
in Shutts were bound by the class action judgment only if they
were adequately represented in the class action proceeding. In-
deed, the Supreme Court had previously held that it would vio-
late due process to bind an absent class member to a judgment
from a proceeding in which the member was not adequately
represented. See Hansberry v. Lee .... Thus the class members
in Shutts still possessed their right to attack the class action judg-
ment collaterally, presumably in the forum of their choice, alleg-
ing that the representative plaintiff did not represent them
adequately.
153
Carlough v. Amchem Products, Inc., 154 was the immediate sequel to Real
Estate Title. Carlough picked up a theme implicit in Real Estate Title: The
"consent" of nonresident class members established in personamjurisdic-
tion and, in turn, would support the issuance of an injunction. The court
believed that, under Shutts, consent can be inferred simply from the fail-
ure to opt out.
On the basis of decidedly singular facts, Carlough upheld an antisuit
injunction against class members who did not opt out. The district court
was near resolving a nationwide, opt-out asbestos class action when a par-
allel state court class action limited to West Virginia residents was com-
menced in a West Virginia state court.155 The state court plaintiffs sought
"a declaration that the proposed Carlough settlement is unenforceable
and not entitled to full faith and credit in the [state court]."156 On ap-
peal, the district court's order enjoining prosecution of the state proceed-
ing was affirmed. 157 After reaffirming Real Estate Title's rejection of "rigid
rules" for personal jurisdiction, 158 the Third Circuit once again fell back
upon Shutts's implied consent rationale: "In re Real Estate Title afforded us
an opportunity to examine Shutts and to reaffirm the critical importance
of the right to opt out in drawing any inference of consent to jurisdiction
by absent plaintiff class members who otherwise would have no affiliation
with the forum."'159 Again, the court honed in on the fact that the right
to opt out must, in fact, be in place-not just highly likely to be-before
153. Id. at 767 (citation omitted). Thus, while the MDL court judgment might have
preclusive effect on the substantive claims of the compromise embodied in the judgment,
an issue he left open, see id. at 768-69, due process challenges to that judgment could be
made in F2, see id. at 769.
154. 10 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1993).
155. See id. at 193.
156. Id. at 195-96.
157. The fact that individual class members could opt out did not obviate the need for
an injunction. The "West Virginia suit sought to undermine the viability of the class-action
structure and settlement, thereby satisfying the rigorous standards of the 'in aid of its
jurisdiction' exception [to the Anti-Injunction Act]." Sherman, supra note 8, at 943. The
relief sought in the West Virginia class action raises a reverse Rooker-Feldman issue, that is,
seeking state court review of a federal courtjudgment. See infra text accompanying notes
202-25.
158. Carlough, 10 F.3d at 199.
159. Id.
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an antisuit injunction could be entered.160 Nowhere in the opinion was
adequacy of representation discussed.
Carlough can be regarded as dealing with cases posing the threat of
extortion. F1 is far along in the class proceeding, when suddenly another
proceeding is filed, attempting forcibly to introduce new class counsel
into the bargaining (and fee sharing) process. The magnetic attraction
of an F1 injunction in these circumstances is evident. But the conception
of in personam jurisdiction that underpins its issuance is, in the end, sin-
gularly unappealing. The fundamental issue is one of the scope of in
personam jurisdiction, not of remedy.161 As noted earlier, the in per-
sonam jurisdiction recognized by Shutts is a limited, conditional one.
Failure to opt out cannot have the overriding significance attached to it
by the Third Circuit. In personam jurisdiction sufficient to bind does not
exist-or, rather, is extinguished-unless adequate representation exists
"at all times" throughout the proceeding. While Shutts's "implied con-
sent" fiction permits F1 to define authoritatively the substantive legal and
equitable rights of class members, it does not sanction in personamjuris-
diction in F1 sufficient to prohibit (by way of injunction or preclusion)
due process challenges to in personain jurisdiction in F2.
Finally, the problem presented in GM Trucks HI is the reverse of
Carlough: the case of the migratory settlers.162 After F1 rejects a pro-
posed settlement as inadequate, the litigants (i.e., their counsel) simply
migrate to another forum and present an identical or substantially similar
settlement to a more sympathetic court.163 In GM Trucks II, numerous
160. See id. at 200 ("We do not believe that the mere promise, even certain
eventuality, that the opportunity to opt out of the class will be offered to absent class
plaintiffs satisfies the requirements of due process as defined by Shutts."). The Carlough
court went on to discuss additional restrictions imposed by the Anti-Injunction Act, but
noted that, while "simultaneous federal and state adjudications of the same in personam
cause of action" did not trigger an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, in this instance
settlement was imminent and the state court proceeding would "cause havoc." Id. at
202-04.
161. See Grimes v. Vitalink Comm. Corp., 17 F.3d 1553, 1572 (3d Cir. 1994)
(Hutchinson, J., dissenting) (challenging the argument that differences in remedies
between damages and an injunction were relevant for purposes of in personam
jurisdiction). See also Cottreau, supra note 51, at 497-99. But the majority in Grimes held
otherwise, citing Real Estate Title for the proposition that preclusion may be proper even
when an antisuit injunction is not. See Grimes, 17 F.3d at 1561.
162. The author participated in a limited way in the Third Circuit litigation. He
advised some objectors on their oral argument in the Third Circuit and subsequently
joined a Rule 28(j) submission by one group of objectors. He has also advised some
objectors in the Louisiana proceedings.
163. For example, in Romstadt v. Apple Computer, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 701 (N.D. Ohio
1996), after a federal court in Ohio had rejected a proposed settlement, "the settlers"
simply migrated to a Texas state court. Within minutes, the state court judge conditionally
certified a settlement class. "The settlers," however, did not notify the successful Ohio
federal court objectors of their migration, nor did they even inform the state court that a
federal judge had already rejected the very same settlement. Excoriating the settlors, an
angry Ohio district court judge made clear that, on the existing record, inadequate
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class action lawsuits had been filed in various state and federal courts
asserting that an exterior fuel tank design on their pickup trucks was de-
fective and increased the risk of post-collision fire. 164 The Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation transferred about 26 such suits to the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania. In turn, that court certified a class for settlement
purposes only, and it approved a highly controversial "script" settlement
as "fair, reasonable, and adequate," even though the only dollars actually
awarded went to class counsel. 165 In GM Trucks I, the court of appeals
(anticipating Amchem Products) remanded the case because the district
court had approved a settlement class without determining whether all of
Rule 23's requirements had been satisfied. 166 In the process, however,
the court expressed considerable skepticism about the fairness of the
settlement.
167
On remand, the district court essentially sat on its hands, while the
settling litigants simply changed venue to a Louisiana state court. There,
they converted a pending statewide class action into a nationwide opt-out
class action, and objectors claimed, secured approval of the same settle-
ment upon which the Third Circuit had cast substantial doubt.' 68 MDL
objectors-who had also migrated to Louisiana to object-moved the
MDL court to enjoin the Louisiana proceeding. The district court de-
clined to do so, pointing out, inter alia, that at least some of the state
court representatives were not class representatives in the litigation
before it, and that the MDL court had no authority to enjoin such
litigants.
169
On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the denial of the antisuit in-
junction.17 0 Its opinion came down only days after Baker v. General Motors,
and understandably takes no account of that decision. The court instead
relied heavily upon Carlough. It said that any injunction of the Louisiana
representation existed, and that he would accord no preclusive effect to the Texas
judgment. See id. at 708; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Actions: Interjurisdictional
Warfare, 218 N.Y. LJ., 5, 5 (discussing Louisiana, Alabama, and Texas courts' willingness
to approve possibly collusive settlements on the eve of trial in other jurisdictions and
raising the possibility that these courts may even be unaware of the original proceedings).
164. In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig. (GM
Trucks 1), 134 F.3d 133 (3d Cir. 1998).
165. See In re General Motors Corp. Pickup Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 846
F. Supp. 330, 338, 344 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
166. In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig. (GM
Trucks I), 55 F.3d 768, 799 (3d Cir. 1995).
167. See id. at 804-19.
168. GM Trucks H7 denied this characterization. See 134 F.3d at 139. The court said
that the Louisiana settlement "differs in several ways, all responsive to our comments in
[GM Trucks I]." Id.
169. See In re Pickup Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 961, 1996 WL 683785
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 1996), aft'd, GM Trucks 1, 134 F.3d at 133. Since no class had been
certified and no right to opt out accorded, Carlough, dependent as that case was on the
implied consent rationale, would not support issuance of an antisuit injunction.
170. See GM Trucks 1, 134 F.3d at 141.
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proceeding "would necessarily enjoin ... 5.7 million individual settling
class members and would require [the exercise of] personal jurisdiction
over them."' 71 Since no MDL class action was pending, "there is no basis
upon which we can infer their consent .... Therefore, due process de-
prives us of personal jurisdiction .... -172
B. The Weakness of the Implied Consent Rationale
In treating the failure of a nonresident class member to opt out as
decisive, the implied consent rationale invoked in Real Estate Title,
Carlough, and GM Trucks H cannot bear the weight put upon it. Carlough,
for example, nowhere explained why, in failing to opt out, absent class
members had impliedly consented to the risk of future antisuit injunc-
tions barring even due process challenges in F2. More importantly, in
focusing on a class member's failure to respond to a class notice, the
court inverts notions of "fundamental fairness." Class notices are com-
plex, all too often uninformative, and misleading. They are designed to
encourage inaction; and they are frequently "incomprehensible to aver-
age citizens."1 73 Indeed, it is:
beyond the experience or expectation of reasonable citizens
that the failure to respond to what looks like a slightly unusual
piece of junk mail constitutes assent to the solicitation ... by
171. Id. The fictional character of the statement is striking. The reality is that a
handful of lawyers purported to settle on behalf of 5.7 million plaintiffs. Nor did the court
consider the possibility that in the circumstances before it, the other Louisiana
representatives were sufficiently present for purposes of in personam jurisdiction, first,
because they joined the Philadelphia representatives, and second, because of common
legal representation.
172. GM TrucksIA 134 F.3d at 141. The court also held that the injunction was barred
by principles of preclusion, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and the Anti-Injunction Act.
See id. at 141-46. In considering the absent plaintiff argument one should again note the
often fictional quality of the argument. In reality, the class attorney has an inventory of
potential plaintiffs and is, in fact, the real plaintiff. See Bone, supra note 97, at 104-05
("The mass-tort case shares one feature in common with the small-claimant class action:
Attorneys tend to control the litigation without much oversight by clients."); Green, What,
supra note 48, at 1792 ("Substantial client supervision and monitoring of class actions is a
fiction, however, in both the settlement and trial context and in the 'current' and 'futures'
context."). But there are "real plaintiff" cases, and in those cases an injunction against
attorney litigation becomes troublesome, all the more so because the distinction between
the two situations (real and non-real class plaintiffs) may be beyond the court's
competence to determine.
173. Miller & Crumpp, supra note 24, at 22. See Carrington & Apanovitch, supra
note 48, at 466 n.35 ("The likelihood that a class member will actually receive and
comprehend the notice of the action is in every case very small. Frequently, the cost of
reading and understanding the notice exceeds the benefits, and not infrequently, the
notice is impenetrable to the average citizen."); Resnick, supra note 41, at 855. See also
Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Analysis of Rule 23 to Address the Rulemaking
Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 74, 134 (1996) ("Our impression is that most notices are not
comprehensible to the lay reader.") (quoted in Cottreau, supra note 51, at 481 n.7).
Moreover, courts have been reluctant to insist upon actual notice rather than "best
practicable" notice. See, e.g., Silber v. Mabon, 18 F.3d 1449, 1453-54 (9th Cir. 1994).
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self-selected counsel desiring to represent the recipient in an
action involving serious personal injury or death. There is no rea-
son to believe that a serious personal injury claimant desires to be repre-
sented by class counsel.1
74
If implied consent is to be derived solely from failure to respond to class
notices, courts will have to be a good deal more vigilant than they have
been in scrutinizing the content of these notices.
But my objection runs deeper. No court has explained why a major
transformation in the law-i.e., the elimination of due process challenges
in F2, a safeguard that Judge Becker has characterized as "a necessary
part of the class action scheme"175-should alone turn on the existence
of baroquely written notices that are designed to discourage action and
that require the recipient to take an affirmative action to protect his or
her rights. 176 Shutts does not sanction such a doctrine. In addition to a
right to opt ou., adequate representation must exist at all times.' 77 Im-
plied "consent" to be bound by a proceeding conducted in accord with
due process is one thing; implied "consent" to jurisdiction to be bound by
one that has not been conducted in accord with due process surely in-
volves quite a different conception of consent. 178 Shutts, in fact, an-
nounced a rule of forfeiture, not consent, and the extent of the forfeiture
should not be judicially enlarged. Shutts's forfeiture doctrine does not
yet authorize such extensive adjudicatory authority in F1 over nonresi-
174. Carrington & Apanovitch, supra note 48, at 467-68 (emphasis added) (footnotes
omitted).
175. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
176. Consent theorizing will not work here. Commonly held conceptions of consent
are usually based upon deliberative activity or an affirmation clearly indicating an
intention to consent.
177. The existence vel non of a right to opt out seems largely unresponsive to the
needs of modem class action litigation, whether the issue is Fl's power to preclude or to
channel preclusion challenges to itself. Assuming the (doubtful) propriety of (b) (1) (B)
constructive bankruptcy proceedings and of (b) (2) class judgements that contain
substantial damage claims, why should antisuit injunctions automatically fail absent an opt-
out right? In In Re joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 134 F.RD. 32 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1990),
Judge Weinstein certified a (b) (1) (B) nationwide class action and treated the certification
as enjoining all pending litigation. Id. at 36-39. He did allow applications for exceptions
if "any court, for special circumstances, desire[d] to continue with scheduled trials or
hearings." Id. at 36. He concluded, however, that the Anti-Injunction Act was not a bar to
his order. He did not consider the issue of in personam jurisdiction or Rule 4(k) (1) (A).
178. The Supreme Court has warned against incautious extensions of fictions
concerning implied consent to jurisdiction. See Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R Co., 346
U.S. 338, 340-41 (1953). Surely such a major shift in legal understanding should not, at
least at the close of the twentieth century, turn upon the extension of a clearly quixotic
construct. As Lon Fuller so insightfully pointed out, "[a] fiction taken seriously. [sic] i.e.,
'believed,' becomes dangerous and loses its utility.... A fiction becomes wholly safe only
when it is used with a complete consciousness of its falsity." Lon Fuller, Legal Fictions (pts.
1-3), 25 IlL. L. Rev. 363, 370 (1930).
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dent class members that F1 can preclude (or enjoin) due process chal-
lenges in F2 on the basis of a fictional implied consent rationale. 17
9
IV. PRECLUSION OUTSIDE THE S-f!Ur's FRAMEwoRK
Shutts is, at bottom, about the scope of Fl's authority to preclude
challenges to its decision in F2. Much attention has been directed to the
relevance of minimum contacts and implied consent to the existence arid
scope of that authority. Other possible frameworks exist, however, that
could effectively operate as devices to consolidate all due process chal-
lenges in FI: Use of the All Writs Act; extension of the so-called Rooker-
Feldman doctrine to nonresident class members; and a recently advanced
reinterpretation of preclusion doctrine are the main possibilities on
which to require compulsory appearance by class members in F1 to raise
due process challenges. In my opinion, however, none of these doctrines
properly precludes due process challenges in F2 by nonresident class
members.
A. All Writs Act
The All Writs Act authorizes federal courts to "issue all writs neces-
sary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable
to the usages and principles of law."' 80 Some courts have invoked the Act
to avoid existing subject matter limitations on the jurisdiction of the dis-
trict court by removing otherwise nonremovable actions from state court to
federal court.181 Moreover, some courts invoke the Act to enlarge in per-
sonam jurisdiction.
179. In fact, under existing law, this proposition is equally true of absent in-state class
members. See Epstein v. MCA, Inc. (Epstein U), 126 F.3d 1235, 1242 (9th Cir. 1997),
stating:
There is nothing in Shutts, however-or in any other case-to suggest that Shutts
offers protection only to those absentees who are beyond the in personam reach
of the forum. Because Grimes conflates the requirements of in personam
jurisdiction with the due process safeguards that Shutts guarantees to absent class
members, we respectfully decline to follow it.
Grimes, a 2-1 decision, seems to have assumed that in personam jurisdiction over absent,
nonresident class members sufficient to preclude the underlying substantive law claims
also eliminated all collateral attacks on due process grounds. See Grimes v. Vitalink
Comm. Corp., 17 F.Bd 1553, 1561 (3d Cir. 1994). In Grimes, however, Mr. Grimes himself
appeared and litigated in the prior state court proceeding. Id. at 1555.
180. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1994).
181. See NAACP v. Metropolitan Council, 125 F.3d 1171, 1173-74 (8th Cir. 1997),
vacated on other grounds, 118 S. Ct. 1162 (1998) (collecting cases in which otherwise
nonremovable actions were removed to federal court under the All Writs Act.). Compare
Hillman v. Webley, 115 F.3d 1461, 1469 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that, although the
district court may "enjoin parties before it from pursuing conflicting litigation in the state
court," the All Writs Act does not confer subject matterjurisdiction and does not provide a
basis for the removal of otherwise nonremovable claims); TBG, Inc. v. Bendis, 36 F.3d 916,
926 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating that All Writs Act "does not authorize a court to assume
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Agent Orange IT is perhaps the leading illustration on how the All
Writs Act can be used to expand the in personam jurisdiction of F1.1
82
That case was an attempt to revive the massive Agent Orange I tort litiga-
don that had previously been consolidated in the Eastern District of New
York before Judge Weinstein and had settled on a nationwide basis.
18 3
The class that was certified by Judge Weinstein in Agent Orange I was esti-
mated to include as many as 2.4 million persons.184 The settlement order
contained a judicially approved, privately administered, administrative
agency charged with providing services for Vietnam veterans and their
families.185 The order also contained an antisuit injunction.' 8 6
In Agent Orange II, two class actions were commenced in the Texas
state courts.1 8 7 The cases were removed to two federal district courts in
Texas, although seemingly, there was a lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion.'8 8 Nonetheless, the JPML transferred the removed cases to Judge
Weinstein. The Second Circuit sustained removal on the basis of the All
Writs Act, pointing to the "substantial" and "deleterious" consequences of
a contrary holding on the prior Agent Orange settlement and the need to
guard the integrity of Agent Orange I rulings.' 89 This analysis might have
jurisdiction over claims not otherwise before it"). But see DePerez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d
1368 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting conflict among the circuits).
182. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig. (Agent Orange I), 996 F.2d 1425 (2d
Cir. 1993).
183. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig. (Agent Orange 1), 597 F. Supp. 740
(E.D.N.Y. 1984).
184. See id. at 756. In light of Amchem Products, the certification of this sprawling class
is exceedingly problematic.
185. See Agent Orange II, 996 F.2d at 1429-30.
186. See id. at 1429.
187. See id. at 1430.
188. Removal was predicated on federal subject matter jurisdiction. Although both
complaints were based exclusively on state law, defendants removed by alleging "artful
pleading" of a federal claim, and in the alternative, federal preemption. See Agent Orange
H, 996 F.2d. at 1430.
189. 996 F.2d at 1431 ("If Agent Orange victims were allowed to maintain separate
actions in state court, the deleterious effect on the Agent Orange I settlement mechanism
would be substantial."). Moreover:
The district court was not determining simply the preclusive effect of a prior final
judgment on claims or issues expected to be raised in subsequent collateral
proceedings; it was enforcing an explicit, ongoing order against relitigation of
matters it already had decided, and guarding the integrity of its rulings in
complex multidistrict litigation over which it had retained jurisdiction."
Id. The Second Circuit has been no stranger to All Writs Act removal. See, e.g., United
States v. City of New York, 972 F.2d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1992) (affirming removal of state law
actions to federal court under All Writs Act where issues raised in state court could not be
separated from relief ordered in consent decree); Yonkers Racing Corp. v. City ofYonkers,
858 F.2d 855, 864 (2d Cir. 1988) (affirming removal to federal court on the basis of
"extraordinary circumstance [s]" of nonparties' state law actions where actions might have
frustrated implementation of a consent decree); In re Baldwin-United Corp., 770 F.2d
328, 335-36 (2d Cir. 1985) (affirming that All Writs Act authorizes enjoining of state
proceedings where "necessary to prevent relitigation of an existing federal judgment").
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been more persuasive had Judge Weinstein himself issued the removal
order.190 But the court of appeals never explained the interest of the
Texas federal district courts in authorizing removal' 91
This still leaves unresolved the issue of in personam jurisdiction over
the Texas litigants. Interestingly, however, the Second Circuit did not
rely on the All Writs Acts to establish thatjurisdiction. Rather, it viewed
that issue as foreclosed by its prior decision in Agent Orange 1,192 which
recognized that the MDL court has all the jurisdiction of the transferor
courts. 193 A step is skipped here, but not a big one. On the court's rea-
soning, the transferor court's in personam jurisdiction must first be estab-
lished.194 By filing in the Texas state court, however, the class representa-
tives placed themselves within the Texas federal courts' in personam
jurisdiction.
One remaining issue was the source of the court's power to issue the
original antisuit injunction-as distinguished from class members being
bound by the settlement. 95 Jurisdiction to enter such an order must be
established. In my view, the All Writs Act cannot fill gaps in in personam
190. As Judge Weinstein's opinion at the district court level of Agent Orange U!
corroborates, little doubt exists that he believed he had authority to issue such a removal
order. See Ryan v. Dow Chemical Co., 781 F. Supp. 902, 918 (E.D.N.Y. 1991). If so,
however, this would mean that the act could be used to confer authority on courts
othenvise lacking both subject matter and in personam jurisdiction.
191. In United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977), Justice Stevens,
joined in dissent by three other justices, emphasized that the All Writs Act relief must be
granted on the basis of the issuing court's interest:
[The All Writs Act] must be in aid of [the court's] duties and itsjurisdiction. The
fact that a party may be better able to effectuate its rights or duties if a writ is
issued never has been, and under the language of the statute cannot be, a
sufficient basis for issuance of the writ.
Id. at 189 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (footnote omitted). By analogy, a Texas federal
court could therefore not grant All Writs Act relief to safeguard the interests of a New York
federal court. The majority responded that the asserted distinction between the parties
and the court was "specious" because "[c]ourts normally exercise their jurisdiction only in
order to protect the legal rights of parties." Id. at 175 n.23.
192. See Agent Orange I, 996 F.2d at 1432.
193. The court stated:
Appellants next contend that they are not bound by the Agent Orange I class
action and settlement because the court did not have personal jurisdiction over
them. We rejected this argument on the appeal in Agent Orange I [noting that
transfers under] the multidistrict litigation statute, "are simply not encumbered
by considerations of in personam jurisdiction and venue" and that the transferee
judge has all the pretrial jurisdiction the transferor judge would have had if the
transfer had not occurred.
Id. at 1434-35 (citation omitted) (quoting In re FMC Corp. Patent Litig., 422 F. Supp.
1163, 1165 (J.P.M.D.L. 1976)).
194. There is no suggestion that 28 U.S.C. § 1407 itself can be read, in effect, to
authorize nationwide in personam jurisdiction in the MDL transferee court, even if the
transferor court itself lacked personal jurisdiction.
195. The injunction barred all present and future claims of the (b) (3) and (b) (1) (B)
class members. See Agent Orange 11, 996 F.2d at 1429; Ryan v. Dow Chemical Co., 618 F.
Supp. 623, 624 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
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jurisdiction. No evidence exists that the All Writs Act was intended to be
a bottomless reservoir of such jurisdiction available when everything else
fails. 19 6 Surely, as a general matter, the All Writs Act cannot properly be
read to side-step standard tests governing in personam jurisdiction (or to
create a new relationship between subject matter and in personam juris-
diction). To be sure, in United States v. New York Telephone Co., the
Supreme Court, over four dissents, held that the Act authorizes a federal
court to issue orders "to persons... not parties to the original action" if
they are "in a position to frustrate the implementation of a court order or
the proper administration ofjustice."'9 7 The Court's opinion could be
read to suggest that the Act might provide a basis for in personam juris-
diction when subject matter jurisdiction otherwise exists.' 9 8 But the
Court was divided over whether the Act provided a statutory source for
coercive process directed to a third party who was otherwise clearly within the
territorial jurisdiction of the district court.199 It is unnecessary here to ex-
amine the propriety of invoking the writ to gain personal jurisdiction
over nonresident class members where the underlying federal statute
contemplates nationwide service of process on defendants. But New York
Telephone provides no basis for believing that the Act should be construed
as a general, "emergency all purpose" nationwide long-arm statute used
to relax the requirements of Rule 4(k) (1) (A) whenever a court deems
that result desirable.2 0 0 Accordingly, the Act cannot provide an in-
196. The purpose of the All Writs Act is "'to preserve jurisdiction that the court has
acquired from some other independent source in law.'" Taiwan v. United States Dist.
Court, 128 F.3d 712, 717 (9th Cir. 1997) (quotingJackson v. Vasquez, 1 F.3d 885, 889 (9th
Cir. 1993)).
197. 434 U.S. 159, 174 (1977) (citation omitted). A district court order authorized
the FBI to install and use pen registers and directed the telephone company to provide
facilities and technical assistance. The telephone company resisted compliance with the
order in part. The dissenters did not seriously challenge the majority's claim that the
order was valid. Instead, they asserted that third parties could not be conscripted to aid
law enforcement. See id. at 178-91. In Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. United States
Marshals Service, 474 U.S. 34 (1985), the Court cited New York Telephone with approval as
an illustration of using the Act "to fill statutory interstices." Id. at 42 n.7.
198. See New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. at 172.
199. In dissent, Justice Stevens stated that "the Court never explains on what basis the
District Court had jurisdiction to enter this order." Id. at 188 n.19. In Pennsylvania Bureau,
the Court said that "[in [New York Telephone] the All Writs Act filled a gap in federal
statutes by granting the District Courtjurisdiction over the only party capable of installing
the devices." 474 U.S. at 42 n.7. While the Court concluded that the Act may be available
as a basis for an order requiring federal marshals to transport state prisoner-witnesses, no
question of personal jurisdiction existed because the marshals were within the territorial
jurisdiction of the district court. See id. at 43.
200. See Additive Controls & Measurement Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata, 96 F.3d 1390, 1396
(Fed. Cir. 1996) ("Nothing... suggests that the All Writs Act can be employed as a general
license for district courts to grant relief against non-parties whenever such measures seem
useful or efficient."). Earlier, in Pennsylvania Bureau, the Court had characterized the All
Writs Act as providing "extraordinary remedies when the need arises, [but] it does not
authorize them to issue ad hoc writs whenever compliance with statutory procedures
appears inconvenient or less appropriate." 474 U.S. at 43.
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dependent basis for in personam jurisdiction over nonresident class
members in mass and toxic tort cases who have been "conscripted" into
the class action.
2 01
201. See, e.g., Carlough v. Amchem Products, 10 F.3d 189, 198 (3d Cir. 1993),
followed on this point by GM Trucks 1, 134 F.3d 133, 140-41 (3d. Cir. 1998). Carlough did
not rely upon the Act for in personarnjurisdiction. Under its understanding of Shutts, the
court first had to ascertain that absent class members had consented to jurisdiction by not
opting out. Having found consent, the court then invoked the Act to support an
injunction. See Carlough, 10 F.3d at 199-202; see also United States v. International Bhd.
of Teamsters, holding that the Act:
requires no more than that the persons enjoined have the "minimum contacts"
that are constitutionally required under due process .... Appellants correctly
note that the Act does not enlarge the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
However, all we hold is that if jurisdiction over the subject matter of and the
parties to litigation is properly acquired, [the Act] authorizes a federal court to
protect that jurisdiction even though non-parties may be subject to the terms of
the injunction.
907 F.2d 277, 281 (2d Cir. 1990) (citations omitted); United States v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 948 F.2d 98, 103 (2d Cir. 1991) (same). More recent decisions discussing the
All Writs Act cast little light on the subject because in each instance there was no serious
question of in personamjurisdiction. For example, in In re VMS Securities Litig., 103 F.3d
1317, 1324 (7th Cir. 1996), the court characterized the reasoning in Agent Orange as
"sound" and held that
in the context of complex class action litigation, a federal district court may
appropriately use the All Writs Act to remove and enjoin the prosecution of
subsequent state court claims in order to enforce its ongoing orders against
relitigation and to guard the integrity of its prior rulings over which it had
expressly retained jurisdiction.
But in that case, there was no question as to the district court's subject matter or in
personam jurisdiction. The state law plaintiffs had also been plaintiffs in the federal
litigation, and the district court had retained personal jurisdiction to enforce the terms of
the settlement. See id. at 1320. In its discussion, the court favorably quotes an Eighth
Circuit decision, which observes that "the ability to facilitate the present settlement by
enjoining related suits of absent class members is ancillary to jurisdiction over the class
action itself." Id. at 1324 (quoting with approval, White v. National Football League, 41
F.3d 402, 409 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1137 (1995)). White v. National
Football League itself is also a case of limited precedential value because "each of the
objectors [to the 23(b) (1) class settlement] either had minimum contacts with the forum
or submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the district court by appearing through counsel
to contest the merits of the settlement." 41 F.3d at 408.
Winkler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 101 F.3d 1196 (7th Cir. 1996), did not involve removal or
personal jurisdiction, but it is instructive as to the scope of the Act. The court held that an
antisuit injunction to stay a parallel state court action was appropriate to protect the MDL
court's prior discovery order. See id. at 1202. But the court did not read the All Writs Act
as a source of broad power. It understood the Act to have the same scope as the Anti-
Injunction Act, and said:
We are of the opinion that the district court has authority under the Anti-
Injunction Act to enjoin only those persons (and their counsel) whose cases are
presently part of federal multi district litigation, or who were properly part of
such multi district litigation at the time the court granted Smith's motion to
withdraw as lead counsel.
Id. at 1202-03 (emphasis added).
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B. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
28 U.S.C. § 1257 vests the Supreme Court with appellate jurisdiction
to review final judgments of state courts. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine un-
derstands that statute to bar "direct review in the lower federal courts of a
decision reached by the highest state court."20 2 While the Supreme
Court has never considered the class action implications of this doctrine,
the Seventh Circuit did so in the well-publicized Kamilewicz case.203 The
litigation arose out of a nationwide Alabama opt-out class action settle-
ment involving the Bank of Boston. In essence, the settlement provided
for injunctive relief only.20 4 Some non-opt-out bank customers discov-
ered that their accounts had incurred charges to pay the counsel fees of
the settling Alabama class counsel. For example, the plaintiffs had re-
ceived $2.19 by way of settlement, but their mortgage accounts had been
debited by $91.33.205 The settlement itself drew intense criticism. 206 Pro-
fessor Issacharoff describes it as a "shocking" example of litigants "trading
off rights of third parties who functionally cannot be there."
20 7
The plaintiffs brought suit in an Illinois federal district court against
the settling bank and Alabama class counsel. The complaint, however,
challenged only the monetary part of the state courtjudgment. Invoking
Rooker-Feldman, the district court dismissed the action, and, in a decidedly
opaque opinion, the district court's decision was affirmed by a panel of
the Seventh Circuit.2 08 Five of the court's twelve judges dissented from
denial of a rehearing en banc.20 9 Certiorari was, in turn, denied, even
though the petition had been supported by an amicus brief filed by 24
state attorneys general, and another brief filed by prominent law school
professors.2 10 While the opposition to certiorari stressed the "unusual
202. ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 622 (1989); accordJohnson v. De Grandy,
512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994). The doctrine has its origins in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,
263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462
(1983). See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 49, at 1500-04.
203. See Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 92 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1996).
204. See id. at 508.
205. See id.
206. See, e.g., Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82
Va. L. Rev. 1051 (1996); John C. Coffee, Jr. & Susan P. Koniak, The Latest Class Action
Scam, Wall St.J., Dec. 27, 1995, at All; Barry Meier, Math of a Class-Action Suit: 'Winning'
$2.19 Costs $91.33, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1995, at Al. Judge Shadur described the case as
"the sort of Willie Horton of the class action." Milton Shadur, From the Bench: The
Unclassy Class Action, Litigation, Winter 1997, vol. 23, No. 2, at 3. For a detailed and
sustained criticism, see Koniak & Cohen, supra, at 1057-68, 1270-80.
207. Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 823.
208. See Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., No. 95 C 6341, 1995 WL 758422 (N.D.
111. Dec. 15, 1995), aff'd, 100 F.3d 1348 (7th Cir. 1996).
209. See Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 100 F.3d 1348, 1349 (7th Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1569 (1997).
210. See 117 S. Ct. 1569 (1997).
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facts" of the case,2 11 it was unique only because the federal plaintiffs relied
upon the state court judgment itself as part of their cause of action.
21 2
In the Supreme Court, petitioners and their amnici stressed that
under Shutts they could not be bound by any affirmative monetary obliga-
tions because the Alabama court lacked in personam jurisdiction, the
existence of opt-out rights notwithstanding.2 1 3 Since an affirmative judg-
ment had been entered against them, they were, for Shutts purposes, part
of a defendant class, and Shutts's reasoning could not sustain an affirmative
monetary judgment against nonresident defendant class members.2 1 4 Pe-
titioners also argued that the state court decision could not bar collateral
attack because its decision was based upon inadequate notice and
representation.
2 1 5
Our specific concern here, however, is with the application of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. What the operative content of that doctrine
adds to conventional preclusion concepts is unclear, except perhaps that,
in principle, preclusion can be waived as a defense, while "want of subject
matter jurisdiction" could not be, at least on direct attack.2 16 If, however,
the two doctrines are "quite similar,"2 17 no apparent purpose exists in
retaining Rooker-Feldman as a separate doctrine. If the two doctrines are
not substantially coextensive, however, why should Rooker-Feldman bar an
211. Brief of Respondents at 1, Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 117 S. Ct. 1569
(1997) (No. 96-1184) (facts "are far better suited for a law school examination than for
plenary review by this Court").
212. Plaintiffs nowhere challenged the helpful part of the judgment; they rejected
only that part of the judgment that required the payment of money. See id.
213. See Briefs of Petitioners and Amici Curiae Law Teachers, Kamilewicz v. Bank of
Boston Corp., 117 S. Ct. 1569 (1997) (No. 96-1184).
214. In Shutts, the Court said that, "of course, [it did not] address class actions where
the jurisdiction is asserted against a defendant class." Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472
U.S. 797, 811-12 n.3 (1985).
215. Petitioners also argued that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine had no application to an
action challenging malpractice by class counsel. Principal reliance was placed on Durken
v. Shea & Gould, 92 F.3d 1510 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1553 (1997), which,
however, did not involve a federal court malpractice suit based upon the conduct of class
counsel in a state court proceeding. See Brief of Petitioners at 27-29, Kamilewicz v. Bank
of Boston Corp., 117 S. Ct. 1569 (1997) (No. 96-1184).
216. See, e.g., Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,
456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982).
217. E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1091 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Charchenko v. City
of Stillwater, 47 F.3d 981, 983 n.1 (8th Cir. 1995) (the two doctrines are "extremely
similar"). If so, the purpose of retaining Rooker-Feldman as a separate doctrine is surely
unclear. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 49, at 1504; Wright & Miller, supra note 64,
§ 4469 at 663-68; Gary Thompson, Note, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine and the Subject
Matter Jurisdiction of Federal District Courts, 42 Rutgers L. Rev. 859 (1990) (criticizing
Rooker-Feldman as harmful to federal jurisdiction). In general, there seems to be some
confusion among the lower courts about the scope and content of this doctrine. Compare
GASH Assocs. v. Village of Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 1993) (the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine "has nothing to do with" full faith and credit), with Gauthier v. Continental
Diving Servs., Inc., 831 F.2d 559, 561 (5th Cir. 1987) (the doctrine is "very close if not
identical to" full faith and credit).
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F2 federal action if, under ordinary preclusion principles, the state court
judgment would not be entitled to full faith and credit because it violated
due process?21
8
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine would have to be massively enlarged to
bar absent, nonresident class members from asserting due process chal-
lenges to the F1 judgment.21 9 The doctrine has never been applied
against nonparies, 220 and, as Shutts and other decisions make clear, ab-
sent class members are not "parties," even if they are not perfect strangers
to the litigation.22' Shutts, too, would have to be transformed in order to
say that class members who do not affirmatively exclude themselves are
barred from bringing a suit in F2 by the doctrine even in circumstances
in which the state courtjudgment could not be given full faith and credit
because of inadequate representation.2 22 Moreover, an F2 challenge
based upon inadequate representation focuses on the conduct of the F1
class representatives and class counsel, not on the correctness of the state
court judgment itself.223 It is worth noting here that in Amchem Products,
Inc. v. Windsor, the Court, in discussing adequate representation, quotes
with approval from Judge Easterbrook's dissenting opinion on rehearing
in Kamilewicz.224 Finally, if the F1 state court rendering judgment itself
must reject the initial judgment on a due process collateral attack, how
218. See Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 100 F.3d 1348, 1350 (7th Cir. 1996)
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting) ("[A] judgment that is not entitled to full faith and credit
does not acquire extra force via the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.").
219. Without discussion, GM Trucks II applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to the
Louisiana settlement achieved by the "migratory settlers." In re General Motors Corp.
Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig. (GM Trucks I), 134 F.3d 133, 143 (3d Cir.
1998). The court simply cited Kamilewicz, ignoring entirely the controversy over that
decision. See id. In any event, unlike the Kamilewicz plaintiffs, the objectors actually
appeared in the Louisiana court to object to the proposed settlement. Moreover, in the
MDL injunction proceeding, no adequacy of representation claims were raised against the
Louisiana proceeding. See id.
220. See, e.g., Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1006 (1994) ("But the invocation
of Rooker/Feldman is just as inapt here, for ... the United States was not a party in the
state court."); Bennettv. Yoshina, 140 F.3d 1218,1223-24 (9th Cir. 1998) ("[Tlhe doctrine
is not implicated ir. this case because it applies only when the federal plaintiff was a party to
the state suit.")
221. See supra note 55.
222. See Kamilewicz, 100 F.3d at 1350 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
223. But see Postma v. First Fed. Say. & Loan of Sioux City, 74 F.3d 160, 162 (8th Cir.
1996) (Rooker-Feldman applicable "'[w]here federal relief can only be predicated upon a
conviction that the state court was wrong'") (quoting Keene Corp. v. Cass, 908 F.2d 293,
296-97 (8th Cir. 1990)).
224. See Anichem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2249 (1997) ("parties 'may
even put one over on the court, in a staged performance'"); see also Issacharoff, supra
note 1, at 819 n.44 ("What makes this remarkable is that six members of the Court are
endorsing the view that more vigilance is required in a case in which the Court had only
recently denied certiorari review.").
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can a federal court do otherwise, given the express command of the full
faith and credit statute?
225
C. Revised Preclusion Doctrine
The ALI proposal on complex litigation, in addition to providing
authority in transferee courts to issue antisuit injunctions, also grants
transferee courts authority to give class members notice of a right to in-
tervene and notice of an intention to preclude regardless of whether or
not recipients exercise their rights to intervene.226 Comments to the pro-
vision describe it as a "new procedure"-a part of a comprehensive pro-
posal that would require legislative enactment.22 7 Marcel Kahan and
Linda Silberman, however, insist that existing preclusion law already em-
bodies the substance of notice of an intention to preclude. 228 They claim
that, as long as F1 has adequate procedures in place to determine due
process issues such as adequate representation,2 29 the F1 "court's deter-
mination [on adequacy] .. . is binding on absent class members."
230
Form alone governs: In practice, of course, this standard would allow no
collateral attacks, because all (or nearly all) courts have procedures
equivalent to Rule 23.
Kahan and Silberman's claim lacks support.23 ' They acknowledge
that their description of existing preclusion law is inconsistent with the
225. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367,
373 (1996). See also Epstein v. MCA, Inc. (Epstein fl), 126 F.3d 1235, 1241 (9th Cir. 1997)
("[N]o Delaware court would attach preclusion to the issue of adequate representation
.... Under § 1738, neither may we.").
226. See Complex Litigation, supra note 8, at § 5.05. For a general discussion, see
Sherman, supra note 8, at 950-59.
227. Complex Litigation, supra note 8, § 5.05 cmt., at 276.
228. See Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, Matsushita and Beyond: The Role of
State Courts in Class Actions Involving Exclusive Federal Claims, 1996 Sup. Ct. Rev. 219.
Kahan and Silberman argue that "[tlhe broad role for collateral attack advocated by the
federal plaintiffs in Matsushita . . . claims too much. It would inhibit class action
settlements...." Id. at 277. This reasoning seems driven by a wholly undefended premise
that absolute finality in any judicial proceeding is the summum bonum of the legal system.
This assertion that less than complete finality would "inhibit" settlements is advanced
without any empirical support.
229. "[Als long as the court entertaining a proposed class action affords class
members fair opportunity to raise the issue, adequacy of representation should be raised
directly, and not be permitted to be raised collaterally." Id. at 264.
230. Id.
231. Their entire affirmative case seems to be no more than a claim that "the
Supreme Court . . . has left unanswered . . .whether state rulings on [adequate
representation] can be second-guessed in a collateral attack." Id. at 265. They claim that
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940), stands for the proposition "that ajudgment need not
be recognized if there was no full and fair opportunity to raise objections in the initial
proceeding," but that "it offers little guidance as to the obligations of parties who forgo the
opportunity to challenge adequacy in the initial proceeding and later attempt to raise a
collateral challenge." Kahan & Silberman, supra note 228, at 267. See also infra note 233.
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Restatement (Second) ofJudgments. 23 2 Contrary to their assertion, their
claim is also inconsistent with Hansbeny v. Lee,23 3 and ignores the lan-
guage with which the Court begins its opinion in Richards v. Jefferson
County:234 "In Hansbeny v. Lee we held that it would violate the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to bind litigants to ajudg-
ment rendered in an earlier litigation to which they were not parties and
in which they were not adequately represented."235 Finally, their claim is incon-
sistent with a considerable body of lower court case law, 2 36 existing inter-
pretations of Rule 23,237 and the understanding of commentators. 238
232. See id. at 267 n.161 (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 42 cmt. e
(1982) (discussing § 42(d))).
233. Kahan and Silberman misdescribe the holding in Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32
(1940). While the), correctly recognize that the case is not about notice (since the person
sought to be precluded in the second action was the spouse of the plaintiff in the first
action), see Kahan & Silberman, supra note 228, at 266 n.156, they incorrectly contend
that Hansbeny is only about inadequate procedure, see id. at 266-67. Contrary to what they
intimate, however, there were objectors in the first suit, and there is no reason to believe
that these objectors were not in the position to make all available arguments. Hansbeny
referred to inadequate procedures, to be sure, see Hansbery, 311 U.S. at 41-42, but it was
decided on the substantive ground that the F1 plaintiff could not be an adequate
representative because his interests were in conflict with the interests of the parties in the
second action. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 808 n.1 (1985) ("The
holding in Hansbery, of course, was that petitioners in that case had not a sufficient
common interest with the parties to a prior lawsuit such that a decree against those parties
in the prior suit would bind the petitioners."); Epstein v. MCA, Inc. (Epstein HI), 126 F.3d
1235, 1246 (9th Cir. 1997) ("No procedure can reliably protect an absent plaintiff who
does not in fact have an adequate representative in court championing his cause. The
court recognized this salutatory principle in Hansbeny... and it has never retreated from
it.").
234. 116 S. Ct. 1761 (1996).
235. Id. at 17E4 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
236. Epstein II. for example, squarely rejects their claim, see Epstein II, 126 F.3d at
1246.
237. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989). After their union had unsuccessfully
sought to intervene in a settlement between the city and black firefighters, and after
several individual white firefighters had unsuccessfully challenged a class action settlement,
another group of white firefighters sued, asserting that the settlement imposed a scheme
of racial discrimination. The Court held that the new group was not bound by the
settlement. The Court rejected the claim that they were precluded by the priorjudgment
or that they were under an affirmative duty to intervene. "Joinder as a party, rather than
knowledge of a lawsuit and an opportunity to intervene, is the method by which potential
parties are subjected to the jurisdiction of the court and bound by ajudgment or decree."
Id. at 765. As Professor Issacharoff observes, there is a strong resemblance between
strangers to a litigation and absent class members. See Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 823.
For a strong defense of Martin and a penetrating examination of the congressional efforts
to overrule it in the civil rights context, see Samuel Issacharoff, When Substance Mandates
Procedure: Martin v. Wilks and the Rights of Vested Incumbents in Civil Rights Consent
Decrees, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 189, 192-94 (1992).
238. See Hart and Wechsler, supra note 49, at 75 (Supp. 1997) (pointing out in
discussion of the Epstein I litigation that "[t ] he binding effect of a class action... turns on
such issues as the adequacy of representation... [which must exist] in the proceedings
leading up to the settlement and its "final approval"); Woolley, supra note 1, at 571 & n.2,
578 n.34 ("Since the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Hansberny v. Lee, courts and
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Simply put, the authorities demonstrate that adequate representation,
not simply adequate procedures, must exist at all times.
Kahan and Silberman contend, however, that collateral attack "is a
post-settlement opt-out that undermines the ability to settle a class action
altogether.' 23 9 The "altogether" claim is without any empirical support.
Moreover, collateral attack would undermine a settlement only if there
were a problem with adequate representation. Kahan and Silberman's
obsession with absolute finality for global settlements ignores these facts
and fails to account for the dangers of distant forum abuse inherent in a
world of races to judgment and reverse auctions. Indeed, if this is the
"Age of Settlement," as one approving commentator asserts, 240 Kahan
and Silberman never seriously contemplate that collateral attacks are espe-
cially necessary to the legitimacy of settlement class actions.241 Professor
Issacharoff states:
Legal enforceability of prearranged settlements is the critical is-
sue facing the courts today .... [Yet] [p]erhaps in no other
context do we find courts entering binding decrees with such a
complete lack of access to quality information and so completely
dependent on the parties who have the most to gain from
favorable court action.
24 2
Ignoring the fact that class notices are often misleading and
designed to encourage inaction, 243 and relying entirely and uncritically
upon a version of Shutts's in personam jurisdictional rationale that
reduces it to a failure to opt out,244 Kahan and Silberman in effect advo-
commentators have often assumed that adequate representation-rather than an
individual opportunity to be heard-is the touchstone of due process." (footnote omitted)
(collecting authorities in note 2)). Kahan and Silberman cite Hart & Wechsler, see Kahan
& Silberman, supra note 228, at 227 n.44, but proceed to ignore their description of Epstein
L
239. Kahan & Silberman, supra note 228, at 268 (emphasis added).
240. Green, What, supra note 48, at 1774.
241. Early in the article, Kahan and Silberman acknowledge the special dangers
inherent in settlement classes in connection with exclusive federal claims, see Kahan &
Silberman, supra note 228, at 235-46, and they acknowledge that "potential dangers in the
[global state court] settlement process necessarily raise questions about the adequacy of
representation," id. at 269. But they brush these dangers aside too quickly in their
discussion of collateral attack and focus unduly on the "strong policies with respect to
finality of, and respect for, state court adjudication." Id. at 270.
242. Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 807-08.
243. Kahan and Silberman state that their "proposal would prevent a federal plaintiff
who fails to respond to the state court's invitation to participate in the state court hearing
from attacking a state court global settlement collaterally." Kahan & Silberman, supra note
228, at 258 (emphasis added). What "invitation"? Class notices are designed to
discourage-not invite-participation, a matter that has escaped their attention.
244. Kahan and Silberman acknowledge that "[t]o some degree . . . adequate
representation.., is akin to ... [personal] jurisdiction: both go to the basis of the court's
authority.., and both implicate due process of law," Kahan & Silberman, supra note 228,
at 263, but they claim that "forcing a class member to object to the adequacy of
representation in [Fl] does not undermine the adequacy requirement," because that court
"does have personal jurisdiction over absent class members," id. at 263-64. This claim
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cate a rule of compulsory appearance in F1 for class members in any
(b) (3) class action, according to which a class member must appear in
order to preserve his or her due process rights. 245 In so doing, they ig-
nore that part of Shutts which states that absent class members may sit
back and do nothing: "[A]bsent plaintiff class members.., need not hire
counsel or appear . . . [because] an absent class-action plaintiff is not
required to do anything."246 Shutts contains no suggestion that the con-
sequence of taking the opinion at its word is forfeiture of the conven-
tional right to collateral attack. As both Justice Ginsburg and Justice
Kennedy recently made clear in Baker, compulsory appearance is far re-
moved from the traditions of our law.2 47 Indeed, Justice Ginsburg cited
Martin v. Wilks for that proposition.2 48 Kahan and Silberman's protesta-
tions to the contrary, their claim is inconsistent with settled understand-
ings regarding the binding nature of class actions.2 49
At the very end of this effort, Kahan and Silberman appear to sud-
denly retreat from their categorical prohibition.2 50 They seem prepared
to allow collateral attack by an objector who appeared and made a chal-
lenge that was rejected:
Contrary to some federal courts who seem to regard objections
by federal plaintiffs in the state proceedings as a reason not to
permit collateral attack, we view such an appearance in the state
proceeding as a prerequisite for collateral attack-at least as
long as such an appearance is not clearly futile.251
Kahan and Silberman characterize this "requirement [as] similar to a rule
of exhaustion of remedies."252 If so, it is clearly inconsistent with existing
incorrectly assumes that failure to opt out is all that is required to establish in personam
jurisdiction over nonresident class members. Under Shults, adequate representation is also
a necessary part of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction over nonresident members.
245. See id. ("[A] court hearing a class action does have personal jurisdiction over
absent class members if there has been notice and a right to opt out; [it is accordingly
appropriate to force] a class member to object to the adequacy of representation in the
court entertaining the proposed class suit.").
246. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 810 (1985).
247. See supra notes 12-13; Baker v. General Motors Corp., 118 S. Ct. 657, 666, 669
(1998).
248. See Bake, 118 S.Ct. at 669 (citing Martin v. Wilks, 49 U.S. 755, 761-63 (1989)).
249. Kahan and Silberman's result, moreover, is unworkable. Apparently, they would
bar collateral attack irrespective of the class members' knowledge of the factual
underpinnings relevant to the inadequate representation claim, at least as long as the class
members were aware of the existence of the underlying class action proceeding itself. If so,
that is a grave defect. See Epstein v. MCA, Inc. (Epstein II), 126 F.3d 1235, 1244 (9th Cir.
1997). If, on the other hand, the class members' individual knowledge were a relevant
inquiry, the result would be endless side bar litigation over what the individual absent class
members knew or should have known.
250. Commentators have understood Kahan and Silberman's argument to be
categorical in nature. See, e.g., Hart & Wechsler, supra note 49, at 111 (Supp. 1997)
(preclusion if an adequate opportunity to object exists).
251. Kahan & Silberman, supra note 228, at 279 (footnote omitted).
252. Id. at 279 n.190.
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law, which rejects such a two-bites-at-the-apple approach.253 Nor is there
any convincing case made for the exhaustion argument. If any objector's
claim is sustained in F2 after it has been fully considered and rejected in
F1, the consequence can only exacerbate tensions between the courts.
But, in reality, Kahan and Silberman do not advance an exhaustion argu-
ment. No attack based on inadequate representation is in fact allowed.
The collateral challenge is limited to an assessment of "the structures that
state courts employ in settling federal claims."254 Once again, what mat-
ters is facially fair state court procedure, not substance alone.
Epstein H presented a spin on the foregoing issue. The majority and
dissent agreed that, if adequacy of representation had not been "liti-
gated" in Fl, providing a collateral challenge by absent (in-state and out-
of-state) class members was appropriate. 25 5  In dissent, Judge
O'Scannlain asserted, however, that objectors had litigated the issue, and
accordingly, Fl's determination must be given preclusive effect.256 The
majority denied that the issue had been litigated and that the Delaware
courts would so hold.25 7 In any event, the majority said that the objectors
could not bind absent class members. "Objectors are objectors, not class
representatives. '258 With deference, this view seems plainly correct under
existing law. No state statute or case gave notice to anyone that objectors
acted as class representatives with authority to preclude absent class mem-
bers.259 Moreover, if an objector could conclusively bind all other class
members, courts would have to develop a whole new body of law: the
Doctrine of the Adequate Objector. Whatever the content of such a doc-
trine might be, surely no objector could accomplish what a representative
could not: binding a class without satisfying due process requirements.
253. This is longstanding law. In Hansberry v. Lee, the Court said that it was "familiar
doctrine ... that members of a class... may be bound by the judgment where they are in
fact adequately represented by parties who are present, or where they actually participate in the
conduct of the litigation." 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940) (emphasis added); see also Epstein II,
126 F.3d at 1246; In re Real Estate Tite & Settlement Servs. Antitrust Litig. (Real Estate
Title), 869 F.2d 760, 771 (3d Cir. 1989); Deboer v. Mellon Mortgage Co., 64 F.3d 1171,
1176 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom. Crehan v. Deboer, 116 S. Ct. 1544 (1996).
254. Kahan & Silberman, supra note 228, at 279.
255. See Epstein 1!, 126 F.3d at 1240, 1257.
256. See id. at 1256 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
257. See id. at 1240-41.
258. Id. (quoting reply brief of Epstein plaintiffs); see Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Cherry,
244 U.S. 25, 29 (1917) ("[I]t must be taken to be established that a court cannot conclude
all persons interested by its mere assertion of its own power, . . . even where its power
depends upon a fact and it finds the fact.") (citation omitted). In protecting the integrity
of the F1 proceeding, the ALI proposal of antisuit injunctions and, more importantly,
notice of a right to intervene and an intention to preclude, provide a mechanism superior
to treating objectors as class representatives.
259. This fact alone is constitutionally decisive of their inability to do so, as made
plain in Richards v. Jefferson County, 116 S. Ct. 1761, 1765-68 (1996) (noting that




This Article examines Shutts's reasoning and lineage, including its
implied consent and fundamental fairness strains, and argues that lower
courts have erred in treating an absent class member's failure to opt out
as synonymous with establishment of sufficient in personam jurisdiction
to prohibit, whether by way of injunction or preclusion, due process chal-
lenges in F2. Under existing law, traditional principles of in personam
jurisdiction-not the relaxed version of consent endorsed in Shutts for
class action plaintiffs-govern the issuance and enforcement of injunc-
tions. And while the Court's opinion in Baker highlights the distinction
between the direct enforcement of injunctions and preclusion in the con-
text of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, this distinction is one to be mini-
mized when the F2 challenge is based on due process grounds. In a
world of reverse auctions and races to judgments, I believe that non-party,
nonresident class members should remain free to challenge an otherwise
preclusive class judgment on due process grounds in a forum of their
choosing.
Nevertheless, notwithstanding my preference for permitting F2 col-
lateral challenges on due process grounds to go forward, I fully recognize
that neither a rule permitting nor a rule forbidding the issuance of an-
tisuit injunctions in the class action context would prevent all forms of
potential abuse. The facts of Carlough and the migratory settler phenom-
enon presented in GM Trucks II are examples of situations where limited
injunctive authority might actually be desirable. 260 The need for compre-
hensive congressional action is apparent and congressional power to re-
order the legal landscape cannot be doubted. Real Estate Title held that,
in a non-opt-out class, due process required reversal of the antisuit in-
junction because the nonresident class members lacked minimum con-
260. My colleague Professor Coffee proposes an intriguing solution to the migratory
settler problem. The F1 court could pass a standing order which states, in effect, that to
satisfy the condition of adequate representation necessary to give preclusive effect to any
F2judgment, the named plaintiffs and their counsel must agree to avoid potential conflicts
of interest in any other forum. This proposal may require legislation, given the limitations
of the Rules Enabling Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1994); Carrington & Apanovitch,
supra note 48, at 461 ("The limit to the Court's authority... is ... explicit in the provision
of the Rules Enabling Act forbidding the court to... modify[ ] or abridg[e] substantive
rights,"). This proposal has decided advantages over collateral attacks that are necessarily
confined only to questions of adequacy of representation and other due process issues.
Professor Coffee's suggestion would not constitute an impermissible collateral attack on
the F2 court, because the litigants have agreed (albeit under pressure) to a procedure that
facilitates an open exchange of information between forums. This format would help
reduce the dangers inherent in the conduct of migratory settlers.
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tacts with the forum.2 6 1 As Real Estate Title itself recognized,262 however,
it is implausible that an antisuit injunction issued by a federal district
court under the express authorization of an act of Congress would be
invalid. Congress could authorize nationwide service of process. 263 In-
deed, it could establish a single district court for the entire United
States26 4 without requiring minimum prelitigation contact with a specific
forum.2 65 This is perfectly apparent when one looks at bankruptcy.
266
In Agent Orange I, the Second Circuit was correct in holding that,
while the Texas litigants had a due process right to challenge collaterally
the adequacy of representation in Agent Orange I, they did not have the
261. See In re Real Estate Title & Settlement Servs. Antitrust Litig. (Real Estate Title),
869 F.2d 760, 769 (3d Cir. 1989). The court concluded that an important due process
distinction exists between actions taken by the court on its own and actions taken by
Congress. In that context, however, the court never considered whether the existence of
nationwide jurisdiction over defendants under the antitrust acts might provide sufficient
basis for nationwide "ancillary" injunctions over absent plaintiff class members. See id. at
767-68. This postulated distinction is troublesome. The court takes no action on its own;
all exercises ofjudicial power are pursuant to statute. Is the court holding that the existing
statutes governing district courts are unconstitutional to the extent that they authorized
the antisuit injunction? Further exploration of this topic is beyond the scope of this
Article.
262. See id. at 767.
263. Many cases so assume. See, e.g., Mississippi Publishing Co. v. Murphree, 326 U.S.
438, 442 (1946) ("Congress could provide for service of process anywhere in the United
States."); Robertson v. Railroad Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619, 622 (1925) (Brandeis, J., for a
unanimous court). This conclusion is said to be open to some challenge once the
International Shoe fairness test replaces earlier notions of territorial sovereignty, see Hart &
Wechsler, supra note 49, at 1587-88, but I do not see it as a serious shift. Of course, if
irrationally chosen (e.g., all federal claims arising in Florida must be tried in Alaska), it
would offend the Fifth Amendment on conventional due process grounds. The state
courts, naturally, cannot assert comparable scope to their process by invoking a doctrine of
jurisdiction by necessity. See Helicopteros Nacionales S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 419 n.13
(1984).
264. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 49, at 1588.
265. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(K) (2). Whether this rule is validly promulgated under
the Rules Enabling Act is, to say the least, doubtful. See Carrington & Apanovitch, supra
note 48, at 486-88.
266. Bankruptcy is a nationwide forum for the consolidation and disposal of mass and
toxic tort litigation. Jurisdiction is conferred on the district courts by 28 U.S.C. § 1334
(1994). The extent to which Rule 23 can be used to circumvent bankruptcy has generated
considerable controversy. See, e.g., In re Asbestos Litig. (Ahearn 1), 90 F.3d 963, 982-84
(5th Cir. 1996); id. at 996 (Smith, J., dissenting). No serious doubt exists as to the court's
nationwide jurisdiction. The relevant bankruptcy rule governing service of process has no
territorial limitations. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7004; In re Celotex Corp., 124 F.3d 619,
629-30 (4th Cir. 1997). But see Warfield v. KR Entertainment Inc., No. 97-3707, 1998 U.S.
App. LEXIS 8779 (8th Cir. May 11, 1998) (minimum contacts with the forum state
required). Moreover, pending proceedings against a debtor in any other court are
automatically stayed, see 11 U.S.C.A. § 362 (West 1993 & Supp. 1997), and the court's final
judgment includes an antirelitigation injunction. See id. § 524(a).
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right to make -that challenge in a forum of their own choosing.26 7 The
court said:
Likewise, there is no merit in their argument that removal in
these cases interferes with their right to collaterally attack the
Agent Orange Ijudgment by denying them the forum of their
choice. Although appellants' attack is founded on their consti-
tutional right to due process, nothing in the Constitution or in
our jurisprudence demands that class members have an unchal-
lengeable choice of forums in which to launch it. While the law
as a general rule permits a plaintiff to choose his forum, that
freedom is not absolute, as the removal, venue and multidistrict
litigation statutes and the personal jurisdiction and forum non
conveniens doctrines all demonstrate. It is obvious, from what
presently is occurring herein, that the removal and multidistrict
transfer in the instant case have not impinged unduly upon ap-
pellants' right of collateral attack.
2 68
Constitutional considerations to the side, however, we must be mind-
ful of the existing differences between class action practice and bank-
ruptcy. Bankruptcy jurisdiction is designed as a consolidation mecha-
nism; as such, it does not suffer from reverse auctions and races to
judgment. While pre-trial MDL proceedings ameliorate the latter evils,
the MDL court has no trial authority. 269 More relevant, however, is that
the MDL has limited authority to interfere with parallel state proceedings
under optimum conditions.
Given the present class action landscape, absent class members
should be allowed to make their collateral due process challenges in a
forum of their own choosing. Finally, until Congress acts, Real Estate Ti-
tle's antisuit injunction holding should be retained, and its reasoning un-
derstood as a principle of equitable remedial law even in instances in
which the federal court has nationwide service of process.2 70 The Shutts
fiction should be extended no further. In the present world of races to
judgment and reverse auctions, and in the absence of comprehensive
congressional reforms addressing these issues, further restricting ade-
quacy of representation challenges in F2 courts would greatly exacerbate
both the problems of distant forum abuse and the burdens imposed
upon absent class members.
267. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig. (Agent Orange I), 996 F.2d 1425 (2d
Cir. 1993).
268. Id. at 1432-33.
269. See Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss, 102 F.3d 1524, cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 1818
(1997).
270. On thejoinder of the involuntary plaintiff, see Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 19.
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